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ONE TOO MANY STICKS FOR THE TRADEMARK
BUNDLE? THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF LUXURY BRANDS’ PUSH FOR A POST-FIRST
SALE AUTHENTICATION RIGHT
Betina A. Baumgarten, Esq*
The unprecedented and exponential growth of resale is both a rose and
a thorn to the luxury market. Some fashion brands construe resale as an
opportunity to diversify and expand their client base; while others, who
firmly subscribe to a luxury philosophy grounded in exclusivity, believe resale threatens everything from their brand allure to their very existence. Indeed, when Chanel declared that “[o]nly Chanel itself can know what is genuine Chanel,” it opened Pandora’s box by providing far more than a peek
into its litigation strategy. Chanel’s declaration all but declared war on the
secondary resale market in not only undermining the authenticity of authentic products in the resale stream of commerce, but in claiming the sole right
to preserve, protect and police its marks throughout its branded products’
life, well after the first sale.
Because counterfeiting’s proliferation and resale’s global expansion,
luxury brands’ desire to police their trademarks has effectively expanded the
* This Note is all about second chances—and this dedication would not be complete without thanking the powers that be that have afforded them to me. Thank you to Professors Susan
Scafidi and Jeff Trexler for your guidance, brainstorming, patience, and support in this endeavor
of obtaining my LLM in Fashion Law and writing this thesis/magnum opus. It is a privilege and
an honor to know and work with you both, and I am so grateful for the opportunity, especially as I
commence the third iteration of my career. It is an honor and privilege to publish in my alma
mater’s Entertainment Law Journal, to accompany my Comment, published many moons ago in
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review while I was a student at Loyola Law School. I’ve come
full circle and the irony is not lost on me. Thank you. Adam, Zachary, and Gabby—you are the
reasons for everything I do and for all that I am, and I love you more. I hope I make you proud
each and every day. Every day is an opportunity, and it is never too late to start anew, revise,
revisit, explore, and reinvent. Zachary and Gabby, I encourage you to do so always and know I’m
here cheering you on every step of the way.
Disclaimer: I am Of Counsel for The RealReal, and while this article was written prior to my
commencing work for the company, the ideas and opinions expressed herein are mine alone and
not those of The RealReal.
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scope of trademark enforcement rights beyond what the Lanham Act confers. Largely as a result of the law’s inability to keep pace and afford mark
holders expanded enforcement rights to target counterfeiters at their source,
luxury brands have resorted to policing their marks through instituting litigation against resellers, “partnering” with resellers to serve as authentication
gatekeepers to the resale stream of commerce; or in expanding their own
businesses by bringing resale in-house. Irrespective of whichever poison
they pick, luxury brands are effectively seeking to expand their trademark
rights beyond the first sale—which the Lanham Act’s legislative history specifically proscribed against—in effectively adding a stick to the trademark
bundle of rights to claim a post-first sale trademark enforcement and authentication right. In so doing, luxury brands are pushing the bounds of trademark law into the very territory the Lanham Act drafters feared mark holders
world: antitrust territory.
This Note examines how luxury brands’ recent entree and involvement
in resale raises antitrust concerns and how both luxury brands and resellers
can more effectively address their concerns within the bounds of trademark
law through alternative respective resale engagement strategies; revised
strategies to solidify their respective legal and market positioning; and partnership opportunities between resellers and luxury brands to collaborate in
fighting their common enemy in counterfeiting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Chanel declared that “[o]nly Chanel itself can know what is genuine Chanel,”1 it perhaps spoke the very words many luxury brands contemplate but never dared utter aloud. However, in instituting its most recent
trademark infringement lawsuit, this time against luxury consignment retailer, The RealReal, 2 Chanel’s statement demonstratively elucidates not
only its ferocity concerning its brand’s protection, but also its underlying fear
of resale in general. Indeed, with fashion trade publication headlines that
read “Gucci and The RealReal Announce a Game-Changing Partnership,”3
“Chanel and Farfetch Sign Exclusive Innovation Partnership,” and “Why
Kering4 Invested in Vestiaire Collective,”5 unlike fashion trends themselves,
resale and luxury brand partnerships are anything but fleeting. It is no wonder that resale’s6 exponential growth of late is both a rose and a thorn to the
luxury market: some brands view resale as an opportunity, while others, who
1. Complaint at 11, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, No. 1:18-cv10626-VSB (S.D.N.Y. 2020) [hereinafter Chanel Complaint]. As of April 5, 2021, the Southern
District of New York issued an order approving the parties’ joint stipulation to stay the case in
favor of mediation, which remains pending. See generally Joint Stipulation & Ord., Chanel, Inc.
v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, No. 1:18-CV-10626 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) [hereinafter Joint
Stipulation & Ord.].
2. The RealReal, The RealReal Announces First Quarter 2021 Results, GLOBE NEWSWIRE,
https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2021/05/10/2226667/0/en/The-RealReal-Announces-First-Quarter-2021-Results.html [https://perma.cc/4EAP-VMBA]. The RealReal is one
of the largest online luxury consignment retailers (and a public company) with eighteen brick-andmortar retail locations across the country, having reported almost $100 million in gross revenue in
the first quarter of 2021. About The RealReal, https://www.therealreal.com/about [https://perma.cc
/P76E-5CSR].
3. Emily Farra, Gucci and The RealReal Announce a Game-Changing Partnership, VOGUE
(Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.vogue.com/article/gucci-the-realreal-partnership-secondhand-consignment [https://perma.cc/TLK2-TJRW].
4. Kering is a French based “global Luxury group” that “manages the development of a
series of renowned Houses in Fashion, Leather Goods, Jewelry and Watches” such as Gucci, Saint
Laurent, Bottega Veneta, Balenciaga, Alexander McQueen, and others. The group prides itself on
approaching luxury in a sustainable and responsible way. KERING, https://www.kering.com/en
/group/ [https://perma.cc/RML4-7CJ5].
5. Robert Williams, Why Kering Invested in Vestiaire Collective, BUS. OF FASHION (Mar.
1, 2021, 8:48 PM), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/luxury/kering-acquires-5-stake-investiaire-collective [https://perma.cc/LQG6-FTKY].
6. Throughout this Note, “resale” or “resellers” shall collectively refer to resale/resellers,
consignment/consignors.
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firmly subscribe to a traditional luxury philosophy premised on scarcity and
exclusivity, view it as a threat.
However, Chanel’s declaration has far reaching implications and seemingly unintended consequences. Fundamentally, it reflects Chanel’s principled belief that only Chanel (and perhaps by implication, any luxury brand)
is capable of authenticating its products at any point in the commerce stream
and on resale. But more importantly, Chanel implies that its registered marks
and trademark law itself confer those exclusive rights. As the internet facilitated counterfeiting’s proliferation and resale’s global expansion, luxury
brands naturally feared resale’s consumer diversion and the resale of counterfeit marked goods. Worse still, luxury brands ultimately feared that counterfeits practically indistinguishable from the genuine product, known as
“super fakes,” were in higher demand than the genuine goods themselves.
Relying almost exclusively on trademark protection, luxury brand mark
holders forcibly expanded the boundaries of trademark law, invoking it as
both a shield to protect against the unauthorized use of its marks and a sword
to protect a mark’s strength, “selling power,”7 and goodwill. No longer a
mechanism to protect consumers from deception and confusion, trademark
law became the vehicle mark holders invoked to preserve their brands.
With the law’s inability to keep pace and gross limitations in failing to
eradicate counterfeiting at the source, luxury brands find themselves with
few means of legal recourse to effectively combat the dangers counterfeit
products pose in commerce and especially in the resale market. As such,
luxury brand mark holders recognized the need and opportunity to engage in
the resale market by asserting resale authentication rights. Whether by suing
resellers,8 “partnering” with resellers to position themselves as resale commerce stream authentication gatekeepers, or acquiring ownership interests in
third-party resellers, luxury brands effectively added, like in a game of “pickup sticks,” an additional right to authenticate on resale to the trademark bundle. However, claiming this “resale right” contradicts the Lanham Act’s legislative intent, which explicitly rejected resale rights for mark holders to preclude “bad monopolies.” With a burgeoning resale market and luxury
brands’ legitimate concerns, the questions become these: (1) how can luxury
brands engage in resale and/or ensure the authentication of their marked
7. Hugh C. Hansen et al., Panel III: Trademark Dilution and Its Effects on the Marks of Big
and Small Business, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025, 1028 (2009).
8. “Resellers” herein refers generally to reseller and consignment retailers, which include,
but are not limited to, e-commercial businesses such as The RealReal, What Goes Around Comes
Around, and Fashionphile.
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goods in resale without triggering anti-trust and/or monopoly scrutiny; and
(2) how can resellers effectively withstand luxury’s challenges to its authentication methods and overall business legitimacy?
This Note examines how the nature of luxury, the internet’s proliferation of counterfeiting, and the facilitation of resale’s unparalleled growth,
has forced luxury brands to push the boundaries of trademark law to claim a
post-first sale authentication right and its unintended consequences. Part I
examines underlying luxury philosophies and how trademark law consequently evolved from protecting consumers against confusion and deception
to affording brand protection. Part II explores how the evolution and growth
of counterfeiting and resale necessitated brands’ reliance on their registered
trademarks to protect their brands and the issues surrounding authentication
as the basis for why luxury brands engage in resale. Part III addresses how
luxury brands “engage” in resale and how their exercise of resale authentication rights effectively constitutes adding a post-first sale authentication
right to their trademark bundle—and the consequences thereof. Part IV proposes several legislative, legal, and business solutions for resellers and luxury brands alike, including: (1) their respective resale engagement strategies
that respect the Lanham Act’s boundaries; (2) strategies to solidify respective legal and market positioning; and (3) partnership opportunities between
resellers and luxury brands to pool resources in fighting their common enemy in counterfeiting.

II. LUXURY BRANDS’ EXCLUSIVITY IS REINFORCED THROUGH
RELIANCE ON TRADEMARK RIGHTS
A. Exclusivity Is the Heart of Luxury
“[A] woman spending in excess of $1,000 for a pair of shoes is
probably not buying those shoes because of their role in comfortably protecting her feet.”9
While many definitions of luxury exist,10 Coco Chanel’s remains
among the most notable: “[l]uxury is a necessity that begins where necessity
9. Ben Kleinman, Luxury Markets, Antitrust, and Intellectual Property: An Introduction,
90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 742, 744 n.2 (2008).
10. Theorists and luxury experts define luxury in various ways. Some define luxury as
“things which are not necessary, but which give you pleasure or make life more comfortable.”
Definition of ‘Luxury Goods’, COLLINS ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com
/dictionary/english/luxury-goods [https://perma.cc/AS3D-GFVM]. While others regard luxury as
possessing characteristics, such as: (1) a qualitative hedonistic product made to last; (2) offered at
a price far exceeding what its functional value commands; (3) tied to a heritage culture; (4) that is
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ends.”11 Luxury is more than affording additional comfort or pleasure. It is
inextricably tied to economic and social stratification, and thus, exclusivity.
Central to luxury brands’ identity, luxury preserves its exclusivity through
high price tags few can afford12 and tightly controlled, select distribution.13
Viewed as something to be earned and cherished, luxury creates actual and
perceived exclusivity by “set[ting] up the necessary obstacles to the straining
of desire, and keep[ing] them in place,” whether they be geographic (a limited number of stores located in high-fashion, select cities that are often expensive to travel to); financial (expensive to buy and to access); or strategic
(years long waitlists for an entry level Hermes Birkin bag with upwards of a

purposefully restricted and offered only through controlled distribution; (5) offered with personalized accompanying services; and (6) representing a social market making the owner or beneficiary
feel special, with a sense of privilege. See J.N. KAPFERER & V. BASTIEN, THE LUXURY STRATEGY:
BREAK THE RULES OF MARKETING TO BUILD 47 (2d ed. 2012). Indeed, exclusivity exists both in
owning something few others do and in excluding others from so doing. See id. at 103. Some
distinguish luxury goods from luxury itself: “The high-quality and creative ready-to-wear is identified as a luxury symbol”; “Luxury is research, the chance to experience new routes, to find new
and not predictable or already seen solutions. Experimentations are luxury. And it’s a fortune finding them and being able to have them.” Franca Sozzani, What Is the Meaning of Luxury?, VOGUE
ITALIA (Mar. 5, 2011, 8:00 AM), https://www.vogue.it/en/magazine/editor-s-blog/2011/03/march5th [https://perma.cc/58ZM-AFPN].
11. Woody Hochswender, Review/Television; The Chanel Who Created the Fashions, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/25/movies/review-television-the-chanel-who-created-the-fashions.html [https://perma.cc/3SKV-69HA] (quoting Gabriella “Coco”
Chanel).
12. Kleinman, supra note 9, at 748–49 (explaining that luxury’s goal is to “enable invidious
comparison by being expensive” and “limit pecuniary emulation by being priced out of the range
of the masses.”).
13. Luca Solca, How Luxury Brands Sell ‘Exclusive’ Goods by the Millions, BUS. OF
FASHION (June 22, 2020, 5:20 AM), https://www.businessoffashion.com/opinions/luxury/luxuryexclusivity-pricing-chanel-louis-vuitton-dior [https://perma.cc/U7UM-FSWJ].
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$10,000 price tag14) to enhance their allure and covet-ability.15 As such, luxury brands utilize every means available to them to curate a unique experience—from elaborate campaigns to a rich boutique experience replete with
custom scents, sights, sounds, and logo-embossed cocktail napkins, which
work to enhance and preserve their respective messaging and experience.
Consumers, in turn, regard the ownership of luxury goods as more than just
a symbol of social status or economic stature. Indeed, purchasing luxury
goods is an investment in assets16 that at worst will hold their value, 17 and at
best, appreciate over time.18
14. The waitlist for Hermès’ Birkin and Kelly bags can extend up to and beyond six years.
Hermès First Time Buyer Guide, BAGHUNTER, https://baghunter.com/blogs/insights/hermes-handbag-first-time-buyer-guide [https://perma.cc/ZYN7-9UZ9]; see also Patricia Ann Hitzler & Günter
Müller-Stewens, The Strategic Role of Authenticity in the Luxury Business, in SUSTAINABLE
MGMT. OF LUXURY: ENV’T FOOTPRINTS AND ECO-DESIGN OF PRODS. AND PROCESSES 29, 45
(M.A. Gardetti ed., 2017) (explaining how in the case of Hermes, clientele must visit a companyrun boutique, located in only a handful of cities, to be deemed eligible to even purchase a bag. If a
person is so deemed, Hermes places their name at the end of a two year waiting list—a sign of “one
of the last true luxury suppliers could simply increase the number or craftsmen to meet the growth
in demand. But this approach would contradict the company’s philosophy. . . .Instead, as a result
of this practice, it secures its authentic position. Profit motives thus take a back seat.”).
15. J.N. KAPFERER & V. BASTIEN, THE LUXURY STRATEGY: BREAK THE RULES OF
MARKETING TO BUILD, 71 (2nd ed. 2012); see Hermès First Time Buyer Guide, supra note 14; see
also Hitzler & Müller-Stewens, supra note 14, at 45.
16. See Unraveling Kering’s Investment in Vestaiaire Collective, BUS. OF FASHION (Mar.
5, 2021) (downloaded using iTunes) (where Max Bittner, Vestiaire’s Chief Executive Officer, describes luxury branded as “assets and not just consumer goods” because of their high residual
value).
17. A pre-owned Hermès, Kelly, or Birkin bag in “good condition” can “fetch up to or more
than 80 percent of what the previous owner invested, a bag in excellent condition up to or more
than 100 percent of what the previous owner invested, and a bag in pristine condition up to or more
than 120 percent of the previous owner invested [sic].” Are Birkin Bags Really a Better Investment
than Stocks and Gold? One Company is Actively Testing that Theory, FASHION L. (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.thefashionlaw.com/are-birkin-bags-really-a-better-investment-than-stocks-and-goldone-company-is-actively-testing-that-theory/ [https://perma.cc/FL4H-AS62]. Indeed, many investment analysts regard investing in a Birkin bag as a better investment than in the stock market.
See Nina Golgowski, Hermes Handbags Are A Better Investment Than The Stock Market, Study
Says, HUFFPOST (Jan. 14, 2016, 2:55 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hermes-bags-investment_n_5697a827e4b0ce496423521e [https://perma.cc/F8GM-W75M].
18. Baghunter, a Beverly Hills online luxury handbag retailer, stated: “Hermès Birkin handbags are a better investment—on an annualized basis—than gold and the stocks in the S&P 500
index.” Are Birkin Bags Really a Better Investment than Stocks and Gold? One Company is Actively Testing That Theory, supra note 17 (citing The Investment Value of Hermès, BAGHUNTER,
https://baghunter.com/blogs/news/investment-value-of-hermes [https://perma.cc/RNS8-UGJ3])
(claiming a Hermes Birkin handbag’s value increased 500 percent in the last thirty-five years).
Having studied the market swings over a thirty-five-year period leading up to present, as between
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B. With Few Other Means of Legal Recourse or Protection, Luxury
Brand Trademark Holders Rely Almost Exclusively on Trademark
law for Mark and Brand Protection
1. As Drafted, the Lanham Act Sought to Protect Consumers Against
Confusion and Deception by Granting Mark Holders Limited,
Exclusive Trademark Use
The principles underlying luxury—durability, quality, and exclusivity—are embodied not only in the brand curated consumer experience and in
the products themselves, but in the trademarks they bear. Consumers readily
recognize two interlocking black “Cs” as Chanel vertically descending and
overlapping “Y,” “S,” and “L,” as Yves Saint Laurent (now referred to as
Saint Laurent), and an “L” overlapping a “V” as Louis Vuitton. Consumers
also associate distinctive colors, such as red on the sole of a shoe as Christian
Louboutin, red and green striped webbing as Gucci, and robin’s egg blue as
Tiffany. These marks, and many others, are just a few examples of luxury
brand trademarks that, along with the products that bear them, are a brand’s
most valuable asset. And once a consumer is willing to pay for a product
simply because it bears a famous trademark,19 trademark protection becomes
all the more imperative for brands to obtain and protect at all costs.
However, trademark holders have few means of legal recourse or protections,20 other than trademark law as established by the Lanham Act, on
which to protect these assets. Passed in 1946,21 the Lanham Act protects
investing in a Birkin handbag, gold, or the stock market, the Birkin constituted “the safest and least
volatile investment,” having not been subject to the market’s ebbs and flows. Id. More often than
not, luxury goods, and especially Hermes products, “are more expensive to buy used than new.”
Id.
19. Kleinman, supra note 9, at 747.
20. Indeed, copyright law does not afford protection for fashion designs, despite noble efforts to pass legislation. See S. REP. NO. 112-259 (2012); see also Sara R. Ellis, Copyrighting
Couture: An Examination of Fashion Design Protection and Why the DPPA and IDPPPA are a
Step Towards the Solution to Counterfeit Chic, 78 TENN. L. REV. 163, 165–66, 174 (2010). While
patent law can afford protection under narrow circumstances via design or utility patent, it is generally inapplicable to fashion design in general. See id. at 178–79; see generally Intellectual Property 101: A Primer, FASHION LAW (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/intellectualproperty-rights-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/D66Y-JPDG].
21. In 1870, Congress passed the first federal act conferring trademark protection which
permitted trademarks to be registered irrespective of whether they were used in interstate or foreign
commerce. However, the Supreme Court ruled the act unconstitutional, as it exceeded Congress’
power under the Commerce Clause from which trademark rights derive. Indeed, the Court specifically distinguished copyrights and patent rights from that of trademark on ground that while the
Constitution protects the “right to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing
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trademarks, which originally constituted a registered word, name, symbol,
device, or any combination used in commerce to: (1) identify and distinguish
the marked goods from those manufactured or sold by others; (2) indicate
the source of the goods; and most significantly, (3) protect consumers against
confusion or mistake, or an intent to deceive the consumer through a mark’s
unauthorized use.22 Long regarded as copyright and patent law’s “ugly stepsibling,” trademark law’s legal origins were based on “priority of appropriation”;23 whereas copyright and patent law derive from Constitutional origins, affording rights “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.”24 At the time it was passed, the
Lanham Act protected only fanciful25 and arbitrary26 marks and remedied
earlier trademark legislation’s inadequacies, which permitted perpetual ownership of a mark without the need for re-registration, even without

for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries,” trademarks fell outside that realm, as they were “simply founded on priority of appropriation.” 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
5:3 (5th ed. 2021) (citing In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)). It was not until three
decades later, in 1905, that Congress enacted the first modern trademark statute, which by today’s
standards was limited in scope to protecting only fanciful and arbitrary marks. See id. Even after
amendment, the Act proved insufficient, effectively precluding the registration of service marks
and permitting perpetual ownership of a mark once registered without the need for re-registration
or even commercial use. Id. Ironically, it was at an American Bar Association meeting in 1920
that the Lanham Act was originally conceived. After several drafts and years of Congressional
hearings, the Lanham Act as we know it today, was passed in 1946, and took effect in 1947. See 1
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:4 (5th ed.
2021).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1127.
23. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 5:3.
24. Id.
25. A fanciful mark “comprise[s] terms that have been invented for the sole purpose of
functioning as a trademark or service mark. Such marks comprise words that are either unknown
in the language (e.g., PEPSI, KODAK, and EXXON) or are completely out of common usage (e.g.,
FLIVVER).” Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, USPTO (Sept. 12, 2021), https://
tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/Oct2012#/Oct2012/TMEP-1200d1e7036.html
[https://perma.cc
/8CML-WNCH].
26. An arbitrary mark “comprise[s] words that are in common linguistic use but, when used
to identify particular goods or services, do not suggest or describe a significant ingredient, quality,
or characteristic of the goods or services (e.g., APPLE for computers; OLD CROW for whiskey).”
Id.
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commercial use.27 The Lanham Act effectively created limited monopoly
power for trademark holders by imposing durational limitations for a mark’s
ownership. This ensured that trademarks were not “a governmental grant of
an exclusive right; . . . [they] [we]re the antithesis of monopoly, making possible a choice between competing articles by giving the consumer distinguishing symbols” that “protect both [the] seller and consumer from fraud
and misrepresentation.”28
Trademark law also focuses on consumer protection. Congress recognized that trademarks constitute a “visual symbol of the good will and reputation that a business has built up”29 deserving of “protect[ion] in the exclusive use thereof.”30 To facilitate the protection of their marks, the Lanham
Act confers trademark holders private rights of action to assert direct31 and
indirect32 trademark infringement claims and associated derivative claims for
unfair competition, false endorsement, 33 as well as counterfeiting34 against
any perceived infringers. These rights and causes of actions are central to
trademark law and protection in that they aim to inhibit the type of competition35 that could otherwise deceive and confuse consumers36 as to a product’s
27. See MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 5:3.
28. Id. § 5:4.
29. Id. § 3:2.
30. Celotex Co. v. Millington, 49 F.2d 1053, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
31. Direct infringement occurs when a “reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark” is used in commerce “in connection with the sale . . . [of] goods . . . with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1)(a); see also Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.14
(1982).
32. Indirect, or contributory infringement, occurs when a party intentionally induces another party to infringe on a third-party’s registered trademark; or when a party continues to supply
its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know it is engaging in trademark infringement.
See Inwood Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. at 854.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
34. See id. §§ 1114(1), 1116(d)(1)(A).
35. See Jessica M. Kiser, Brands as Copyright, 61 VILL. L. REV. 45, 50–52 (2016).
36. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495–96 (2d Cir. 1961)
(“Courts consider eight factors, known as the “Polaroid factors” in assessing whether “a likelihood
for confusion” exists for the ordinary prudent consumer”); Chad Gilson, Putting the Brakes on
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origin or as to an affiliation between the mark holder and its unauthorized
user. This is especially true of counterfeiting. Regarded as an aggravated
form of trademark infringement that “seeks to trick the consumer into believing he or she is getting the genuine article,”37 Lanham Act drafters treated
the production, selling, or introduction of a product bearing a counterfeit
mark into commerce as a strict liability offense, intending to protect the consumer public regardless of the offender’s intent.38

2. The Internet’s Growth and Luxury Mark Holders’ Reliance on
Trademark Law Expanded Trademark Law’s Focus from Protecting
Consumer Rights to Protecting the Mark Holders’ Brands
Themselves
The internet’s growth prompted revolutionary change in how the world
conducts business. As commerce traversed state boundaries into international ones, trademark law followed suit, shifting in focus and expanding in
scope to protect not simply the consumer public, but the strength and integrity of mark holders’ brands themselves. A “tool of commerce,”39 trademark
law’s breadth grew alongside commerce itself, prompting trademark holders
to develop additional means through which to convey source identification.
Following suit, the Lanham Act expanded to include trade dress, or things
“that signal[ed] source,”40 affording mark holders exclusive rights to use

Monopolistic Trademark Expansion: Where the First Sale Defense Stands Against Post-Sale Confusion in the Wake of Automotive Gold v. Volkswagen, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 223, 227–28 (2012)
(“No single factor is dispositive, and the court balances them in evaluating whether a likelihood for
confusion exists”).
37. Gucci Am. v. Guess?, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 207, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
38. See Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Ultimate One Distrib. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 3d 137,
156 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Fitzgerald Publ’g, Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d
Cir. 1986)) (“trademark infringement . . . is a strict liability offense, meaning ‘intent or knowledge
is not an element of infringement.’”). Though subsequent legislation, namely the 1984 Federal
Counterfeiting Act, contemplated including a two-part Safe Harbor provision which could relieve
a potential infringer of liability, the final version ultimately excluded the provision, and revision of
the Lanham Act’s strict liability remains unchanged. See 130 CONG. REC. H12076-77, 12077 (daily
ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement on trademark counterfeiting legislation).
39. Kiser, supra note 35, at 50.
40. Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. UNIV. CHI. L.J.
75, 86 (2014).
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registered scents, colors, and even tactile feelings.41 The advent of trade
dress protection signaled the beginning of trademark law’s evolution, as
trademark law became more than simply a device to convey “otherwise indiscernible information concerning a product,”42 and a means to save consumers “search costs made possible by the information or reputation the
trademark conveys or embodies about the brand”43 and its “expected quality.”44 Rather, trade dress “recognize[d] the investments being made by
trademark owners in the larger notion of the trademark-affiliated brand.”45
Through judicial construct and later legislative amendment, Congress promulgated first the 1995 Federal Dilution Trademark Act (“FTDA”)46 and further expanded trademark protection to protect against cyber-squatting in enacting the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) in
1999.47 The enactment of both of these statutes unequivocally reshaped

41. See id. at 86–87; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3). Historically, trade dress “referred
only to the manner in which a product was ‘dressed up’ to go to market with a label, package display
card and similar packaging elements.” Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d
27, 31 (2d Cir. 1995). The modern view of trade dress is much more expansive and is defined as a
product’s “total image” or “overall appearance” and “may include features such as size, shape,
color or color combinations, texture, graphics or even particular sales techniques.” John H. Harland
Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980, 984 (11th Cir. 1983) (cited with approval in Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992)).
42. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 371 (1999).
43. Greene, supra note 40, at 85; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 163–64 (1995) (precluding others from using one’s trademark to source identify “reduces the
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions . . . [as it] quickly and easily assures
a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as
other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.”).
44. See Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1982: Hearing on S.B. 2428 Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm., 97th Cong., 12 (1982) (statement of William F. Baxter).
45. Kiser, supra note 35, at 61.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). The FDTA protected famous marks from third-party uses that
“blurr[ed]” or “tarnish[ed]” it, where the third-party’s use impaired the distinctiveness of the famous mark—not because the use actually confused or diverted consumers in diminishing competition. See id. Use of a mark without fear of dilution is permissible in advertising or for promotional
purposes when referenced for identification, for non-commercial use, and in all forms of news reporting and commentary. See id. §§ 1125(c)(1), (c)(3)(A–C); see, e.g., Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). The ACPA created a cause of action against an individual who in
bad faith intended to profit off another’s protected mark, including one’s personal name, by registering, trafficking, or using a domain name identical or “confusingly similar” to the mark, or in the
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trademark law, evidencing an unprecedented expansion of rights.48 A trademark claim could now be brought under the FTDA or ACPA “regardless of
the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of
actual economic injury.”49 Now, senior mark holders could arguably sue the
owners of junior marks even where there was no confusion or likelihood for
confusion and where no measurable economic harm was suffered.50 Focused
squarely on protecting the mark holder and not the consumer, Congress’ enactment of the FTDA reframed trademark law as one of brand protection.51
Indeed, in recognizing the trademark owners’ significant investment in the
mark and the “aura of the mark itself,”52 trademark law extended to protect
the goodwill the brands’ investment in its trademarks generated.53 Consequently, Congress effectively encouraged mark holders to invest in their
marks and brands.54 This “creeping expansion of trademark protections”
bolstered mark holders’ otherwise limited ability to police their rights in order to maintain them and uphold the value of their brand and exclusivity of
case of a famous mark distinctive at the time of the domain name’s registration, is “identical or
confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark.” Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i–ii).
48. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1697–98 (1999); see also Kiser, supra note 35, at 62–63 (proffering that the codification of dilution protection was done “at the expense of the public domain,” as dilution claims
can be brought regardless).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
50. Kiser, supra note 35, at 63.
51. See id. at 63–64.
52. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 (1995).
53. See MCCARTHY, supra note 21, at § 2:17 (citing to Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.,
173 F.3d 1109, 1122 (8th Cir. 1999)) (a mark’s good will reflects the “likelihood” and “human
propensity to continue doing business with a seller who has offered goods and services that the
customer likes and . . . fulfill[s] her needs.”); see id. § 2:19 (citing to Washburn v. Nat’l WallPaper Co., 81 F. 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1897)) (“[T]here has been produced an element of value quite as
important—in some cases, perhaps far more important—than the plant or machinery with which
the business is carried on. That [good will] is property is abundantly settled by authority and indeed, is not disputed.”).
54. See Irina D. Manta, Branded, 69 SMU L. REV. 713, 724–25 (2016) (citing to Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1896
(2013)). Affording dilution protection now protected mark holders even in the case where their
marks might have lost prestige or value as a result of a junior mark or even if their ability to enter
new markets was impeded. Id. at 728.
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their product but not without criticism that trademark law boundaries were
being pushed too far.55

3. A Trademark Holder’s “Bundle of Rights” Constitutes a Legal,
Limited Monopoly Because the First Sale Doctrine Expressly Limits
Mark Holder’s Rights in Both Scope and Duration
Because the Lanham Act confers trademark holders’ exclusive rights56
to control the use of their registered mark, theorists rightfully regard trademark law as a form of intangible property law.57 It follows that a mark
holder, like a real property owner, is conferred a bundle of rights the holder
can exercise in protecting its property, including the most fundamental of
property rights: the right to exclude others.58 In addition to exclusionary
rights, the Lanham Act’s “bundle of rights”59 also includes a trademark
holder’s right to: (1) exclusively use its registered mark to identify the source
of its goods to prevent consumer confusion;60 (2) alienate the mark;61 (3)
preserve an owner’s investment and goodwill in its mark and in the mark’s

55. Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
371, 423 (2003); see generally Lemley, supra note 48 (detailing and criticizing the expansion of
trademark protection).
56. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
673 (1999) (“[t]he Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable
property interests—notably, its provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the
‘property’ of the owner because he can exclude others from using them,” thereby rendering exclusive use of the trademark an essential right of trademark law).
57. See Sigmund Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 323, 323 (1949).
58. Mossoff, supra note 55, at 414.
59. Id. at 415; see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:10 (5th ed. 2021) (While “a ‘trademark’ is physically evident as a designation appearing on a product or in an ad on an internet page . . . legally it is a bundle of rights in
intellectual property.”).
60. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 817–18 (1927).
61. 1 McCarthy, supra note 21, § 5:3 (noting that trademark holders are able to sell or
license their marks, just as much as marks can be bought. Goodwill transfers with the alienation of
any mark, as it cannot exist apart from it).
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value and strength;62 (4) a legislatively codified, private infringement right
of action against the mark’s misuse or misappropriation;63 (5) the right to
remedies for harm caused as a result of the mark’s infringement or other
misuse/misappropriation;64 and (6) the right to control distribution of the
mark through the first sale,65 among others.
Though deemed “exclusive,” the trademark bundle of rights is tempered with exceptions as non-mark holders may use another’s registered
mark in commerce for identification purposes—also known as “nominative
fair use”66—without infringing thereon or may license a mark from the mark
holder for delineated purposes. Trademark rights are also limited in duration
pursuant to the first sale doctrine. Derived from copyright law and applied
through judicial construction to trademark,67 the first sale doctrine exhausts
a trademark holder’s exclusive distribution rights upon the first sale of goods
bearing the trademark.68 Therefore, “[r]esale [of genuinely marked goods]
by the first purchaser of the original article”69 does not constitute infringement nor unfair competition.70 The rationale follows that even though
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c), (d).
63. Id. § 1114(1).
64. Id. § 1117.
65. Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1995);
see also 1 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 22:47 (4th ed. 2003).
66. Nominative fair use or using a mark to describe or identify the goods, does not constitute trademark infringement. See Century 21 Real Est. Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inv., 425 F.3d 211,
219–20 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that where use of the mark “does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one . . . [s]uch nominative use of a mark—where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is
pressed into service –lies outside the structures of trademark law); see also Yvette Joy Liebesman
& Benjamin Wilson, The Mark of a Resold Good, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 183–84 (2012).
67. The first sale doctrine as codified in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that
an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder
receives the right to sell, display, or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the
interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold
that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), (c).
68. See Sebastian Int’l, Inc., 53 F.3d at 1075.
69. Id. at 1074.
70. Liebesman & Wilson, supra note 67, at 188–89 n.218. Resale by the first purchaser of
the original article under the producer’s trademark is neither trademark infringement nor unfair
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subsequent resales may occur without the trademark owner’s consent, there
is no consumer confusion as to the origin of the goods because “the origin
has not changed as a result of the resale.”71 Unlike copyright law, however,
the first sale doctrine remains uncodified and is often treated as an affirmative defense to infringement allegations whereby a trademark defendant
bears the burden of proving it resold genuine, lawfully acquired goods.72
Nevertheless, limiting trademark holders’ rights through the first sale
evidences the law’s clear “distaste”73 for alienation restraints on property in
only allowing “the holder of intellectual property rights to obtain the price
for its creations only once.”74 Indeed, conferring any “exclusive” right historically triggered fear and a knee-jerk reaction that so doing would yield an
“illegal” monopoly75 on that sale of goods such that “‘the public would be
injured rather than protected, for competition would be destroyed.’”76

competition. Sebastian Int’l, Inc., 53 F.3d at 1076. Note that the first sale doctrine does not apply
to trademarked goods that are materially different from those sold by the trademark owner. Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
71. Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2001)
(internal citations omitted).
72. David W. Barnes, Free-Riders and Trademark Law’s First Sale Rule, 27 SANTA CLARA
COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 457, 465 (2011).
73. Id. at 458.
74. Id.
75. U.S. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) (Trademark law
generally regards a trademark as a limited and legal monopoly right, whereas illegal monopolies
are the subject of antitrust law, which prevents a single company from controlling the market and
preserving competition.); see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2; see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27.
Courts have been careful to differentiate between trademark “monopolies” and antitrust “monopoly
theory,” noting that the latter analysis is grounded in economic and mathematical methodologies
(e.g. assessing percentages of ownership of overall market shares) in deterring anti-competitive
conduct. See Harold R. Weinberg, Is the Monopoly Theory of Trademarks Robust or a Bust?, 13
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 137, 156–57 (2005).
76. Weinberg, supra note 75, at 141 (quoting Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 320–22
(1871)); see also Bell Canto Design, Ltd. v. MSS HiFi, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 208, 222–23 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (“As a general matter, ‘trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a
true mark even though the sale is not authorized by the mark owner’. . . . [nor] does [it] give mark
holders the right to control subsequent, non-authorized resales, as long as the product sold is genuine.”).
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However, with “rights to a name only,”77 and imposed requirements as to
time, use, and scope,78 legal scholars and judges alike rebutted concerns that
trademarks “partake of the evil aspects of an illegal ‘monopoly’”79 because
trademark protection is ultimately “socially desirable,”80 and does not pose
the same threats that other forms of intellectual property could.81 Though
trademark is often considered a limited monopoly,82 and fundamentally regarded as both a source identifier and means of preserving goodwill,83 experts reasoned that “there is a monopoly [only when] there is no need for any
distinguishing.”84 Moreover, merely possessing limited monopoly power is
not per se illegal—it is the possession of monopoly power coupled with anticompetitive conduct that poses the greatest “danger to the competitive picture,”85 as it pushes the boundaries of trademark law into conferring “bad”
monopoly power.86
To balance the need for mark holders’ to have exclusive rights to use
their mark in commerce along with the desire to prevent “bad monopolies,”
77. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997).
78. Generally speaking, after registering one’s trademark, the mark holder must use it in
commerce and file documentation between the fifth and sixth year after registration demonstrating
its continued use. As long as the mark is used in commerce and the proper fees are paid and papers
filed, the trademark can remain registered to that mark holder for its exclusive use indefinitely. See
Keeping Your Registration Alive, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/maintain/keepingyour-registration-alive [https://perma.cc/Z9TY-8X9Y].
79. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 2:12 (5th ed. 2021); see also S. REP. NO. 79–1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
1275 (assuring that in protecting trademarks, it “can be done without any misgivings and without
the fear of fostering hateful monopolies, for no monopoly is involved in trade-mark protection.”).
80. Weinberg, supra note 75, at 145 (quoting Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 42
(2d Cir. 1945)).
81. Clorox Co., 117 F.3d at 56.
82. Artype, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695, 696–97 (2d Cir. 1956).
83. See Weinberg, supra note 75, at 142–43.
84. 1 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:12 (5th ed. 2021) (citing to Rogers, Goodwill, Trademarks and Unfair Trading
51 (1914)).
85. Id.
86. See infra Section IV.D.
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the Lanham Act drafters ultimately rejected the notion of protecting mark
holders’ rights in perpetuity and limited them in duration through the first
sale.87 While early drafts of the Lanham Act actually afforded mark holders
rights to control their marked goods on resale,88 legislators ultimately refused to confer resale rights to mark holders because concentrating unlimited
control in mark holders’ hands would empower original manufacturers with
rights “to control remote sellers, distributors or repairers,”89 and “vest in the
original manufacturer of trademarked products extensive control over distributors of both new and second-hand products and materials.”90 Conferring
seemingly unfettered resale rights would also “seriously interfere with legitimate activities” of the resale market.91
In striking mark holders’ resale rights from the Lanham Act, the drafters recognized that ultimately, “trade-mark is only property in a limited
sense.”92 As a trademark can be transferred with its business, the mark owner
retains the right to enforce the mark against its competitors insofar as it
87. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
88. Sec. 32(3) of the draft Lanham Act provided in relevant part that “[i]f goods bearing a
registered mark have been put on the market by or with the authority of the registrant of a registered
mark or in any package or other container bearing said mark and a notice that the goods may be
resold only unaltered or unrenovated or in the original package or container and said goods or any
part thereof have, without the authority of the registrant, been transferred to another package or
container or been in any way altered or renovated, any person who shall, in commerce, make any
use of or reference to said registered mark upon or in connection with the sale or advertising of
such transferred or altered or renovated goods shall be liable to a civil action by the registrant for
any or all of the remedies hereinafter provided.” Trade-Marks: Hearing on H.R. 82 Before a S.
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong. 10 (1944) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 82].
89. Id. at 63; see Trade-Marks: Hearing on S.B. 895 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Patents, 77th Cong. 39 (1942) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 895] (referencing the “provision giving
the trade-mark [sic] holder dominance over the use of the mark in connection with the resale of the
product.”); see also Hearing on H.R. 82, supra note 88, at 72 (“Under this bill, . . . used equipment
could not be handled without [the] permission of the original manufacturer. This would attach a
restraint that runs along with the chattel after many sales. Inevitably such authorization will not be
given unless the dealer follows the distribution program dictated by the original manufacturer [who
is the mark holder, as discussed earlier in the transcript]. The original manufacturers now dictate
to their own outlets the scrapping of machines which they built. They may be perfectly good machines, but buyers should have the opportunity to determine whether they want them. The [sic]
dictate the prices, they dictate service costs, trade-in values, and so on.”).
90. Hearing on H.R. 82, supra note 88, at 62.
91. Id.
92. Id.

BAUMGARTEN FINAL_ARTICLE_MACROS_2022.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

ONE TOO MANY STICKS FOR THE TRADEMARK BUNDLE?

1/11/22 7:46 PM

131

protects the owner’s goodwill against the sale of another’s product as his
own but not thereafter.93 Imposing this durational limit on the mark holder’s
otherwise exclusive rights to use and control its mark, in addition to the fiveyear ownership period (which was subject to renewal so long as the mark
remained in commercial use), struck the necessary balance in favor of good
and against “bad monopoly” in both conferring exclusive rights to use the
mark, but only for limited periods of time, subject to renewal to encourage
ongoing commercial use. Over time, however, as luxury brands dipped their
toes into the resale market, they tested the first sale doctrine’s boundaries—
but not without unintended consequences.

III. THE RISE AND UNPRECEDENTED GROWTH OF COUNTERFEITING
AND CONSIGNMENT/RESALE FORCED LUXURY BRANDS TO PUSH THE
BOUNDARIES OF TRADEMARK LAW
While the internet and e-commerce afforded many opportunities for
businesses and luxury brands alike, with these immense growth opportunities came increased competition, risks, and threats in the form of counterfeiting and the growth of consignment and resale—threats which impacted luxury brands, their business models, client base, and luxury’s future.

A. The Growth and Proliferation of Counterfeiting Has Undermined
the Luxury Market
Counterfeiting94 and the proliferation of sales of counterfeit luxury
goods95 of late have proven among the greatest threats to luxury brand mark
holders. Yet, counterfeiting is hardly a new phenomenon.96 Before the internet, lining Canal Street on the southern border of New York’s trendy Soho
neighborhood, vendors sold imitation luxury handbags,97 including
93. Id.
94. Counterfeiting is an “aggravated form of trademark infringement” and defined as “the
act of producing or selling a product with a sham trademark that is an intentional and calculated
reproduction of the genuine trademark.” 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:10 (5th ed. 2021).
95. The Lanham Act defines a counterfeit mark as “a spurious mark which is identical with,
or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
96. See DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT AND
PIRATED GOODS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 4 (Jan. 24, 2020).
97. Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2005). As of 2017,
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knockoffs,98 all at drastically reduced prices on undraped fold up tables.99
Obviously of lesser quality than their authentic counterparts,100 the imitation
handbags bore luxury’s most coveted trademarks—Gucci’s “Gs,” Chanel’s
mirror image “Cs,” and Louis Vuitton’s “LVs,” among others. As law enforcement’s increased presence relegated counterfeiters to back alleys, back
rooms, or flea markets,101 the advent and growth of e-commerce transformed
the once contained counterfeit market into an unpoliceable international enterprise designed to fund criminal or even terrorist activities.102 Now showcased on well-designed, seemingly legitimate e-commerce websites, these
advertised “authentic” Gucci, Vuitton, or Hermes handbags are accessible to
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development found that brands like Chanel, Louis
Vuitton, Prada, Hermes, Gucci, and Dior are routinely among the most heavily targeted brands by
counterfeits. The Counterfeit Report: The Big Business of Fakes, FASHION L. (Oct. 11, 2019),
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/the-counterfeit-report-the-impact-on-the-fashion-industry/ [http://
perma.cc/MQ4Z-FP25].
98. In New York, while a counterfeit employs a registered trademark, albeit in an unauthorized manner thereby constituting trademark infringement, a knock-off resembles but does not
employ the registered trademark on the item and is legal under New York law. See Barnett, supra
note 97, at 1394.
99. See, e.g., Betsy Hilliard, Guide to Buying Fake Handbags in New York City, BETSY
BAGS, https://betsybags.com/fake-handbag-guide-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/2GD4-ENR2]; Alice
Hines, Knockoff: Another Day at the Office—on Canal Street with Counterfeit Vendors, VILLAGE
VOICE (May 18, 2016), https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/05/18/knockoff-another-day-at-theoffice-on-canal-street-with-counterfeit-vendors/ [https://perma.cc/6TXU-HYEP].
100. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 25:10 (5th ed. 2021).
101. See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Gata Corp., No. 10-cv-141-LM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45045, at * 10–12, 27 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) (granting plaintiff Coach’s motion for summary
judgment, finding defendant flea market operator liable for contributory trademark infringement
because it knew its vendors were selling counterfeit Coach products, thereby engaging in direct
trademark infringement).
102. See Peter S. Sloane, Trademark Vigilance in the Twenty-First Century: An Update, 30
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1201, 1207 (2020); see also 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:10 (5th ed. 2021)
(citing David Johnston, Fake Goods Support Terrorism, Interpol Office is set to Testify, N.Y. TIMES
(July 16, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/16/us/threats-responses-money-trail-fakegoods-support-terrorism-interpol-official.html [https://perma.cc/4TRE-L2SR]); see also Jon Ungoed-Thomas, Designer Fakes Are Funding Al-Qaeda, SUNDAY TIMES (Mar. 20, 2005, 12:00
AM),
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/designer-fakes-are-funding-al-qaeda-rhcq8wcd9kk
[perma.cc/XBF9-VLV4]; see also Ezra Marcus, Inside Virgil Abloh’s Trademark Ballet, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/04/21/style/off-white-papers.html [https://perma.cc/ABH9-6HBF].
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the world with a single click of a button with few or any barriers to trade or
inspection and even fewer means of monitoring and regulating their production or sales.103 Counterfeit good sales accounted for 40% of all e-commerce
transactions in 2019104 and grew from $5.5 billion dollars in 1982105 to $200
billion by 1996.106 By 2016, the international market for counterfeited goods
was valued at $509 billion dollars,107 and in 2019, the luxury counterfeit market exceeded $2.7 trillion dollars—with over half those earnings attributable
to e-commercial sales—compared to the luxury goods market’s valuation at
$308 billion in 2019.108 With a counterfeit market almost six times its size,
it is no wonder luxury mark holders vigilantly enforce their trademarks to
secure their brands at any and all costs.
These staggering sales figures reveal counterfeiting’s unparalleled proliferation, which is attributable to several factors. First, e-commerce affords
opportunity for expansive growth,109 low-financial barriers to entry, yielding

103. See Sloane, supra note 102, at 1202.
104. Id. at 1202–03.
105. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 25:10 (5th ed. 2021).
106. 142 CONG. REC. H5778, H5778 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of Rep. Moorhead); see also Matthew Benjamin, A World of Fakes, 135 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 46, 46–47
(2003) (stating that the FBI reported U.S. businesses losing between $200-$250 billion every year
to counterfeiting, and U.S. Customs seized between $100 million in counterfeit goods in 2002 as
compared to $57 million in 2001, accounting for over 8% of world trade in 2003).
107. See Sloane, supra note 102, at 1202.
108. Katie Jones, Charting the Rise and Fall of the Global Luxury Goods Market, VISUAL
CAPITALIST (May 26, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/charting-the-rise-and-fall-of-theglobal-luxury-goods-market/ [https://perma.cc/V86M-XPDP]; see also Roberto Fontana, Stéphane
J.G. Girod & Martin Králik, How Luxury Brands Can Beat Counterfeiters, HARV. BUS. REV. (May
24, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/how-luxury-brands-can-beat-counterfeiters [https://perma.cc
/C9SS-YKNE].
109. Indeed, the internet’s democratization of luxury also contributed to counterfeiting’s
rampant growth in several ways. The internet’s accessibility successfully fueled consumer’s aspirations, along with the counterfeiting industry’s ability to satiate those wants with nearly identical
counterfeits at lower prices thanks to the high-resolution detailed photos posted on the brands’ sites
or on influencer’s blogs. Counterfeiters seized readily available brand information and quickly
reproduced nearly identical replicas within hours of their online debut, which undermines luxury
on every level. See generally Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, supra note
96. Indeed, “emulation is [good] when it is limited to elites, . . . [but] as the bandwagon grows,
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high profits and low risk of prosecution,110 as shutting down a platform is
just as easy as creating one.111 Second, the internet and third-party platforms,
such as eBay and Amazon, offer counterfeiters both credibility and anonymity.112 This enables counterfeiters opportunities to evade detection and prosecution by utilizing multiple merchant accounts having provided little to no
(accurate) personal identifying information to consumers, making them virtually untraceable.113 Though verification programs, such as eBay’s Verified
Owner’s Rights program (“VeRO”114) and Amazon’s Brand registry program,115 afford some accountability in allowing consumers to report counterfeit transactions and vendors, its effectiveness is limited. By the time authorities take action against these sellers of counterfeits, their accounts are
often shut down only to “pop right back up—either on the same third-party

the masses will also seek to emulate possibly by obtaining copies and not the luxury itself.” Kleinman, supra note 9, at 749.
110. See Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, supra note 96, at 12,
20.
111. See The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND
DEV., at 14 (2007), https://www.oecd.org/sti/38707619.pdf [https://perma.cc/6F7H-HSLA].
112. See George Anderson, Should Online Marketplaces Be Required to Verify Third-Party
Sellers for Safety’s Sake?, RETAILWIRE (July 24, 2020), https://www.retailwire.com/discussion
/should-online-marketplaces-be-required-to-verify-third-party-sellers-for-safetys-sake/
[https://
perma.cc/38QC-JBFV] (discussing how currently, vendors on third-party sites can effectively remain anonymous and untraceable by creating false aliases and how the pending INFORM Act,
legislation which is intended to provide greater transparency to consumers and assist law enforcement authorities by requiring third-party sites to identify sellers suspected of trafficking in counterfeit, stolen and sometimes dangerous products, could work to improve not only transparency,
but promote better enforcement in cracking down on counterfeiting.).
113. See How Effective Would the Shop Safe Act Be for Fashion and Luxury Brands in the
Fight Against Fakes?, FASHION L. (July 24, 2020), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/is-the-shopsafe-act-2020-a-new-tool-for-brand-owners-in-the-fight-against-fakes/ [https://perma.cc/P2W3VVK6].
114. See Verified Rights Owner Program, EBAY, https://pages.ebay.com/seller-center/listing-and-marketing/verified-rights-owner-program.html [https://perma.cc/C25A-HW4L].
115. See Build and Protect Your Brand, AMAZON, https://brandservices.amazon.com/
[https://perma.cc/S82J-WXXZ].
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marketplace platform or another—through the creation of a new merchant
account.”116
Third, luxury brand mark holders possess few means of legal recourse
apart from the Lanham Act.117 While the Lanham Act delineates causes of
actions for counterfeiting and infringement, mark holders’ inability to lodge
them against counterfeiters, the majority of whom fall outside U.S. law’s
jurisdiction, renders such laws practically unenforceable.118 This only worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic, as consumers forcibly grew more accustomed to shopping online.119 Mark holders’ recourse is often limited as
to third-party platforms; not only are most third-party platforms immune
from liability under relevant law, 120 that recourse is further limited because
third-party platforms are “not necessarily the ones most directly responsible
for the infringing goods.”121 Moreover, though Congress broke down due
116. How Effective Would the Shop Safe Act be for Fashion and Luxury Brands in the Fight
Against Fakes?, supra note 113.
117. See supra note 20; see also Intellectual Property 101: A Primer, FASHION L. (Apr. 26,
2020), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/intellectual-property-rights-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc
/D66Y-JPDG].
118. Loren Yager, Intellectual Property: U.S. Efforts have Contributed to Strengthened
Laws Overseas, but Significant Enforcement Challenges Remain, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF. (June 14, 2005), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-788T/html
/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-788T.htm [https://perma.cc/AC2J-K766].
119. See How Effective Would the Shop Safe Act be for Fashion and Luxury Brands in the
Fight Against Fakes?, supra note 113. While e-commerce was quickly replacing consumer brick
and mortar shopping, COVID-19 accelerated that growth. With retail stores shut down, COVID19 pushed consumers online, resulting in a 32.4% growth in online sales in 2020 ($598.02 billion
in 2020 to $791.70 billion in 2020). Coronavirus Adds $105 Billion to US Ecommerce in 2020,
DIGIT. COM. 360 (June 16, 2021), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article/coronavirus-impact-online-retail/ [https://perma.cc/8SY3-DZS5]. According to the Department of Commerce,
this was the largest online sales growth in any one year for which data is available. Id. Furthermore,
studies further evidence a greater shift among consumers to online shopping following COVID-19,
with an average of 36% of consumers who shop online weekly, as compared to 286% pre-COVID19. Blake Morgan, Fifty Statistics Showing the Lasting Impact of COVID-19 on Consumers,
FORBES (Oct. 19, 2020, 9:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/blakemorgan/2020/10/19/50-statistics-showing-the-lasting-impact-of-covid-19-on-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/W29V-WLSK].
120. The Communications Decency Act section 230 and Digital Millennium Copyright Act
section 512 both afford platforms, such as Ebay and Amazon, immunity for third-party content and
copyrighted content, respectively, posted on their sites. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); see 17 U.S.C. §
512(a).
121. How Effective Would the Shop Safe Act be for Fashion and in the Fight Against
Fakes?, supra note 113. See Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469–70 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (holding third-party platform host eBay did not contributorily infringe on Tiffany’s marks
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process barriers in allowing judges to grant ex-parte seizure orders122 and
enhanced the availability of legal remedies to include criminal or statutory
damages,123 legislation focuses on mitigation, not prevention. Even recent
proposed legislation holding third-party platforms more accountable, including the Shop Safe Act,124 failed to garner support.125 As such, U.S. law offers
few legal means of targeting or dismantling counterfeiting operations at their
source.
Finally, while historically consumers would purchase luxury counterfeits knowing they are not authentic (often due to their lesser quality), the
current counterfeit market is replete with “super fakes,”126 which seek to
because as merely a facilitator and platform host, and not a handler of sales transactions, it lacked
requisite knowledge that the transacted goods were counterfeit and because eBay took reasonable
steps through its VeRO enforcement program to remove the infringing site from its platform).
122. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(d)(1)(A), (d)(4), 1117(a), 1118.
123. Id.
124. The Shop Safe Act sought to amend the Trademark Act of 1946 to establish trademark
liability for online market platforms who harbor counterfeiters. It also incentivized these platforms
to elevate their enforcement best practices, through the adoption of ten (10) measures aimed at
identifying counterfeiters. See Shop Safe Act of 2020, H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. (2020). Given the
Act’s “health and safety” aim, its application to luxury marked goods was indeterminate. Id. However, Trump’s Executive Order 13904 targeting counterfeiting was designed to broadly address ecommerce, which would include fashion and accessories under its umbrella. See Donald J. Trump,
Memorandum on Stopping Counterfeit Trafficking on E-Commerce Platforms Through Fines and
Civil Penalties, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 13, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-stopping-counterfeit-trafficking-e-commerce-platforms-fines-civilpenalties/ [https://perma.cc/E4JJ-DCFR].
125. Fareeha Ali, Proposed Legislation Makes Marketplaces Liable for Counterfeit Goods,
DIGIT. COM. 360 (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/2020/03/04/proposed-legislation-makes-marketplaces-liable-for-counterfeit-goods/ [https://perma.cc/N897-FAL8]. Given
tech’s sizable lobby presence in Washington, it is more likely than not that they did not support—
and likely opposed—the Act, which may have contributed to its stalemate. Id.; see also Cristiano
Lima, Tech Companies Face Another Liability Threat, this Time Over Counterfeit Goods, WASH.
POST (Sept. 30, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/09/30/tech-companies-face-another-liability-threat-this-time-over-counterfeit-goods/
[https://perma.cc/9FBQ4YX9]; see also Cecilia Kang & Kenneth P. Vogel, Tech Giants Amass a Lobbying Army for an
Epic Washington Battle, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/us/politics/amazon-apple-facebook-google-lobbying.html [https://perma.cc/P4VM-VFAQ].
126. “Super fakes” are counterfeits “so good [they] can even stump the experts.” Buyer
Beware: Don’t Get Duped by ‘Super Fake’ Designer Goods, CBS N.Y. (May 8, 2018, 12:05 AM),
https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2018/05/08/super-fake-designer-goods/ [https://archive.ph/WgreP];
Dhani Mau, Counterfeit Handbags Are Getting Harder and Harder to Spot, FASHIONISTA (Mar. 6,
2018),
https://fashionista.com/2018/03/counterfeit-knockoff-handbags-authenticity
[https://
perma.cc/7KEA-DKUU]; see also Betsy Hilliard, High Quality Counterfeit Handbags “Super-
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deceive the consumer into believing the counterfeit is a genuine product.127
Because of technological advances, counterfeits have drastically improved
in quality such that they are often indistinguishable from the authentic luxury
item itself.128 Moreover, given how the internet and e-commerce provide
access to high resolution detailed images, detailed product information, as
well as experts’ published materials about brands’ identifying marks, it is no
wonder counterfeits can—and have—deceived even the luxury brands themselves.129
As such, luxury brands have no choice but to rely on the few legal
means at their disposal to protect both their brand value130 and their clients’

Fakes” Are Close to the Real Thing, BETSY BAGS, https://betsybags.com/super-fakes-counterfeithandbags/ [https://perma.cc/A87Q-VSDZ].
127. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 207, 242 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
128. There are also cases where higher-quality fakes, which are made in the same factories
as the authentic bags but not afforded a serial number of stamps of authenticity, are sold inexpensively either out the back door or on the side. See Mau, supra note 126. Because these “super
fakes” are not technically authenticated by the brand, brands construe them as being counterfeit. It
has yet to be determined whether a court would similarly construe.
129. Praepitcha Smatsorabudh ran a counterfeiting operation whereby she purchased authentic luxury handbags, returned nearly identical replicas to the stores where she purchased the
originals, and sold the authentic items on third-party platforms for profit. After earning over $1million, she was arrested and sentenced to thirty months in prison, and with restitution amounting to
over $400,000. See Arlington Woman Sentenced for Counterfeit Handbag Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/arlington-woman-sentenced-counterfeit-handbag-scheme [https://perma.cc/KUZ8-5RXT]; see also Rachel Weiner, ‘Compulsion to
Have Expensive Handbags’ Lands Woman in Prison, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/compulsion-to-have-expensive-handbags-landswoman-in-prison/2016/12/21/3b9158dc-c7a3-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html
[https://
perma.cc/6T7H-8F4W]; see also Arthur Weinreb, Virginia Woman Arrested in Alleged $1 Million
Handbag Scheme, DIGIT. J. (May 28, 2016), https://www.digitaljournal.com/world/woman-allegedly-made-1-million-in-designer-bag-knockoff-scam/article/466478
[https://perma.cc/7457JPJX].
130. For example, Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessey (“LVMH”) invested over $17 million
annually on anti-counterfeiting legal measures and employs a team of over 60 attorneys. The Counterfeit Report: The Big Business of Fakes, supra note 97. Comparatively, Amazon spent $500
million on anti-fraud efforts ($195 million alone on IP lawsuits), having removed 6 billion fraudulent products from its platform in 2019. Ruiqi Chen, Amazon Taps DOJ Prosecutor, Helps 3M,
Valentino Fight Fake Goods, BLOOMBERG L. (July 8, 2020, 2:56 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/ip-law/XF8M7MDS000000?bna_news_filter=ip-law#jcite [https://
perma.cc/Q6UH-JCTM]; see How Effective Would the Shop Safe Act be for Fashion and Luxury
Brands in the Fight Against Fakes?, supra note 113; see also Marcus, supra note 102.
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investments.131 Not only do counterfeits undermine luxury brands’ values,
but also their credibility in consumers’ eyes, which forces luxury brand
trademark owners to be more vigilant than ever in policing their brands.132

B. Resale’s E-Commercial Growth Poses Challenges for Luxury
Brands
Fashion resale and consignment pose both challenges and new opportunities for luxury brands in particular. Indeed, the luxury resale market
forced luxury brands to revisit their brand ethos, business models, and their
brand’s definition of luxury. Undeniably, thrift,133 pawn,134 and consignment135 shops have come a long way from their brick-and-mortar roots, as
resale evolved from that of need to one of want136 for several reasons.
131. Kleinman, supra note 9, at 750.
132. Sloane, supra note 102, at 1206–07.
133. Thrift shops, such as Goodwill or Salvation Army, sell donated clothing at reduced
prices often to benefit charities. Though successful at keeping clothes out of landfills and in circulation, the majority of donated clothes are shipped overseas for incineration or repurposing. See
Jinhee Han, Understanding Second-hand Retailing; A Resource Based Perspective of Best Practices Leading to Business Success (2013) (M.S. Thesis, Iowa State University) (on file with Iowa
State University); see also Nell Durfee, The Troubled Second Life of Donated Clothes,
SCIENCELINE (June 6, 2018), https://scienceline.org/2018/06/the-troubled-second-life-of-donatedclothes/ [https://perma.cc/F84K-QQFK]; see also Beth Porter, What Really Happens to Unwanted
Clothes?, GREEN AM., https://www.greenamerica.org/unraveling-fashion-industry/what-reallyhappens-unwanted-clothes [https://perma.cc/RUF3-4CKY].
134. Pawn shops sell valuable goods in exchange for cash on the spot or are used to obtain
a loan using a valuable item as collateral. See Regulating Pawnshops: What You Should Know
Before Visiting Your Local Pawn Shop, IMPERIAL PAWNBROKERS (Mar. 7, 2016), http://imperialpawnbrokers.com/regulating-pawnshops-what-you-should-know-before-visiting-your-localpawn-shop/ [https://perma.cc/F4Q6-FBP6]. Pawn shops and all second-hand dealers must be licensed. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 21625; see, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 21300(a). All
received second-hand tangible personal property must be registered in a statewide electronic reporting system operated by the Department of Justice to prevent the trafficking of stolen property.
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 21628(a); see also Secondhand Dealer and Pawnbroker Unit, ST.
OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/secondhand [https://perma.cc/N9C5-2ETW].
135. Consignment shops are businesses that sell the consignee’s goods for a shared commission, whereby the consignor transfers ownership and possession of its goods to the consignee
shop for the latter to sell for a partial commission, shared with the consignee, when the item sells.
See, e.g., Consignment Shops vs Pawn Shops, LAMBERT PAWN, https://www.lambertpawn.com
/consignment-shop-vs-pawn-shop/ [https://perma.cc/PRJ6-5YSS].
136. Indeed, whereas resale, consignment and pawn shops once afforded cash-strapped individuals quick sources of cash either through consigning/selling desirable items or using the items
as collateral for a loan (aka “need”), consumers now view resale and consignment as “wardrobe
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First, like counterfeiting, e-commerce afforded international expansion
and growth opportunities for resale businesses to extend their reach and consumer base from local to international communities. Sifting through $1 bins
at local brick-and-mortar stores137 gave way to easy-to-navigate, visually appealing e-commerce platforms of various natures: some are peer to peer,
such as Tradesy,138 and Poshmark;139 while others, like ThredUp140 follow a
business to consumer model, reselling second hand clothing ranging from
fast fashion to designer and luxury items. Also, business to consumer, at the
opposite end of the spectrum, are luxury consignment sites such as The
RealReal (“TRR”),141 What Goes Around Comes Around (“WGACA”),142
and Vestiaire Collective (“VC”),143 with virtually every designer at every
price point available at a retail consumer’s fingertips. Between 2019 and the
refresh” opportunities (aka “want”). See Cathaleen Chen, Inside the Closet of the Future, BUS. OF
FASHION (Jan. 22, 2020, 5:37 AM), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/retail/rental-resale-closet-of-the-future [https://perma.cc/5X99-P7Y3]. Playing a huge role in promoting and sustaining a circular economy, resale becomes a place to trade in and trade up. See Julie Zerbo, Can
the Birkin Bag Survive the Resale Market?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/04/09/fashion/hermes-birkin-resale-secondary-market.html [https://perma.cc/B4F8-BBPG].
137. Suzanne Kapner, The Rise of Hand-Me-Down Inc., WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2019, 2:46
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rise-of-hand-me-down-inc-11565947804 [https://perma.cc
/Q825-P55R].
138. See TRADESY, http://www.tradesy.com [https://perma.cc/96FY-9795].
139. See POSHMARK, http://www.poshmark.com [https://perma.cc/U4SP-2524] (where
consumers can establish and run their own resale boutiques).
140. See Our Story, THREDUP, https://www.thredup.com/impact [https://perma.cc/Q3KC832G] (an online resale store where consumers can send their closet castoffs to the company in
easy to return “clean out kits,” whereby consumers are paid out directly for accepted items which
are posted for sale on the site, while the company donates/disposes of unaccepted items on the
consumer’s behalf).
141. See THE REALREAL, https://www.therealreal.com/ [https://perma.cc/K7Z2-KCRW].
142. See WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND, https://www.whatgoesaroundnyc.com/
[https://perma.cc/A2ST-CX39]. What Goes Around Comes Around was one of the first luxury
vintage retailers that began in a brick and mortar location in New York in 1993 and has since added
an online presence. About Us, WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND, https://www.whatgoesaroundnyc.com/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/PC9L-GXVD].
143. See The Story, VESTIAIRE, https://www.vestiairecollective.com/about/ [https://
perma.cc/5P9E-7MC5]. Vestiaire Collective, established in 2009 in Paris, is a European based
luxury consignment site that has recently partnered with Kering to expand Kering’s brands’ secondhand market. Id.
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end of 2021, secondhand retail and brick and mortar will shrink by 15%,
while online second hand sales through these sites and others like them will
grow by 69% percent.144 Accessible almost everywhere in the world by almost everyone in the world, the resale marketplace morphed into a global
enterprise—though the laws regulating resale have yet to catch up to reflect
resale’s expansion into interstate commerce, let alone its transformation into
a global market.145
Second, resale’s explosion is directly attributable to consumer’s sustainability awareness.146 Consumers’ once passive recognition of the inextricable link between the global warming crisis and the fashion industry finally became mainstream.147 Consequently, it ignited young and seasoned
shoppers’ interest in and desire to buy second hand to promote fashion’s circularity.148 With over 10 million tons of discarded clothing sent to landfills
yearly,149 both older and younger consumers are turning to resale and consignment to stay fashionable and reduce their carbon footprint.150 In 2020,
33 million consumers shopped second-hand for the very first time,151 and in

144. 2020 Resale Report, THREDUP, https://www.thredup.com/resale/2020/#resale-growth
[https://perma.cc/VJ2T-Q5ZD].
145. See generally supra note 134. Indeed, while all received second hand merchandise
must still be reported to the DOJ site to address stolen goods, the laws have not been updated to
reflect the far more pervasive threat that counterfeiting poses. Moreover, consignment and resale
are still governed by many of the archaic pawn laws from the days where resale/consignment remained mom and pop operations. See, e.g., Secondhand Dealer and Pawnbroker Unit, supra note
134.
146. See 2021 Resale Report, THREDUP, https://www.thredup.com/resale/#size-and-impact [https://perma.cc/FS9B-QAQY].
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Porter, supra note 133.
150. See 2020 Resale Report, supra note 144. Indeed, ThredUp’s report revealed that if
every consumer purchased one gently used vs. new item of clothing a year, it would save 5.7 billion
pounds of CO2, 25 billion gallons of water, and 18,700 garbage trucks worth of waste. Id.
151. 2021 Resale Report, supra note 146.

BAUMGARTEN FINAL_ARTICLE_MACROS_2022.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

ONE TOO MANY STICKS FOR THE TRADEMARK BUNDLE?

1/11/22 7:46 PM

141

2019, over 62 million women in the U.S. shopped second-hand in total.152
The luxury resale market is also experiencing record breaking growth.153
Valued at approximately $24 billion in 2018, it is projected to be worth $34
billion dollars at 2021’s conclusion, representing 41% growth in just three
years.154 These statistics clearly demonstrate that any stigma surrounding
shopping second-hand has vanished.155 The COVID-19 pandemic also accelerated the growth of the resale and luxury resale markets. Pre-pandemic,
the resale market was estimated to triple between 2009-2029; however, new
projections estimate it will double in only a quarter of that time.156
Finally, luxury resale exploded because luxury goods are inherently
sustainable.157 By definition, luxury goods are built to last, as they are handcrafted from high-quality, durable leathers and fabrics. These qualities not
only ensure their longevity, but also make them inherently timeless. Indeed,
it is why Gucci, Chanel, and especially Hermes Birkin bags hold, if not increase, in value on resale and why the luxury resale market is thriving.158
While some luxury brands, such as Gucci and Alexander McQueen,
have embraced opportunities with the second-hand luxury market,159 others,
152. See 2020 Resale Report, supra note 144. Moreover, “[b]argain hunting, environmental concerns and the sharing economy have erased the stigma of used goods at the same time technology has made thrift shopping more accessible, reliable and cool.” Kapner, supra note 137.
153. See Florine Eppe Beauloye, Luxury Resale: A Secondhand Strategy for Brands, LUXE
DIGIT., https://luxe.digital/business/digital-luxury-reports/luxury-resale-transformation/ [https://
perma.cc/ZU3Z-JFLX].
154. See id.
155. Gucci Launches Online Shop with Consignment Site The RealReal, CPP LUXURY
(Oct. 6, 2020), https://cpp-luxury.com/gucci-launches-online-shop-with-consignment-site-therealreal/ [https://perma.cc/RKH6-VG64].
156. See Chavie Lieber, What’s Next for Resale?, BUS. OF FASHION (Apr. 30, 2020, 4:30
AM), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/retail/fashion-resale-poshmark-thredup-depopstockx-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/M8HW-Y6CR]; see also 2020 Resale Report, supra note 144,
at 11.
157. Tonino Pencarelli et al., Luxury Products and Sustainability Issues from the Perspective of Young Italian Consumers, 12 SUSTAINABILITY 245, 251 (2020).
158. Are Birkin Bags Really a Better Investment than Stocks and Gold? One Company Is
Actively Testing that Theory, supra note 17.
159. See, e.g., Gucci Launches Online Shop with Consignment Site The RealReal, supra
note 155; Natalie Theodosi, In the Name of Circular Fashion, Alexander McQueen Partners with
Vestiaire Collective, WWD (Feb. 16, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://wwd.com/fashion-news/fashion-
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like Louis Vuitton, are focusing elsewhere.160 Some marquis brands, like
Hermes161 seek to prevent their products from entering resale, while others,
like Chanel,162 fear it.163 Brands fear that a non-brand cultivated
scoops/circular-fashion-alexander-mcqueen-partners-vestiaire-collective-1234732169/
perma.cc/LKR8-PDAZ].

[https://

160. Of late, Louis Vuitton’s Head of Image and Environment, Antoine Arnault, noted that
“it did not plan to get involved at present,” adding that it is instead focusing on its repair program:
“We have such long-lasting products and we repair them, we for the moment will stick to that and
proposing as beautiful new products, as creative and thrilling new collections as we can.” Joelle
Diderich & Natalie Theodosi, Why Luxury Brands Are Sitting Out the Resale Market Boom, WWD
(Sept. 1, 2021, 1:30 AM), https://wwd.com/fashion-news/designer-luxury/luxury-brands-reluctantto-join-resale-market-1234898376/ [https://perma.cc/VPN7-L7LT].
161. On the Hermes website, Hermes’ “General Terms and Conditions of Sale” includes a
provision that strictly prohibits the resale of any Hermes product: “The Website is intended for
customers looking to purchase products for personal use. Purchasing products on the Website intended for commercial resale is strictly prohibited. When you purchase a product on the Website,
you represent and warrant that you are purchasing the product for personal and not commercial
purposes and that you do not intend to resell, directly or indirectly, Hermès products for commercial
purposes.” General Terms and Conditions of Sale, HERMÈS, at 1, https://assets.hermes.com/is/content/hermesedito/Legal/GTCS_US_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3TK-UPD7]. Additionally, on the
front of all Hermes receipts, similarly states that “you will not, directly, or indirectly, resell Hermes
products purchased in our boutiques for commercial purposes.” Hermès Buyer Beware: Read Your
Receipts, PURSEBOP, https://www.pursebop.com/hermes-fineprint-on-receipt/ [https://perma.cc
/7BX8-PTZ9].
162. Bruno Pavlovsky, Chanel’s President, indicated that Chanel has no interest in or plans
to engage with the second hand market: “We want to retain control of our distribution, and I think
that approach was an early contributor to the success of the brand. We’ve spent the last 20 years
securing that control, so we’re not going to give it up now with partnerships in the secondhand
market.” Diderich & Theodosi, supra note 160. Interestingly, Chanel first entered into a partnership agreement with Farfetch on or about February 19, 2018, but it was later revealed that the
“partnership” was actually part of Chanel’s purchase of a minority stake in Farfetch. See Sarah
White & Pascale Denis, Chanel, Farfetch Pair Up for Digital Push at Fashion Label’s Stores,
REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chanel-farfetch/chanelfarfetch-pair-up-for-digital-push-at-fashion-labels-stores-idUSKCN1G300D
[https://perma.cc
/E7VH-XPKP]. Not even a year later, Farfetch Second Life was launched featuring “Chanel preowned” products, including an archival collection. See Sell Your Designer Bags, FARFETCH
SECOND LIFE, https://www.farfetch.com/positively-farfetch/secondlife/us [https://perma.cc/3LMJVZR2]; see also Maddison Glendinning, A Treasure Trove of Pre-Owned Vintage Chanel Pieces
Just Hit Farfetch, FASHION MAG. (May 7, 2020), https://fashionmagazine.com/style/a-treasuretrove-of-vintage-chanel-pieces-just-hit-farfetch/ [https://perma.cc/E82X-39ML].
163. In unsealed documents disclosed during the What Goes Around Comes Around litigation, Chanel produced a variety of documents that offered an “unprecedented look into Chanel’s
internal discussions about its future and its aggressive tactics for dealing with what it perceives to
be new threats to its business.” Sharon Edelson, The RealReal Cites Antitrust Concerns in Counterclaim to Chanel Lawsuit, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2021, 4:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sharonedelson/2021/02/01/the-realreal-cites-antitrust-concerns-in-counterclaim-to-chanel-lawsuit/
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experience164 or a consumer’s negative experience with a resale site165 and/or
with a pre-owned luxury branded good will turn a client off to a brand completely166—or worse, that resale luxury will cut into luxury’s market share.167
Not only do luxury brands fear the appearance of an affiliation between the
brands and resale sites,168 but a pervasive “‘[f]ear’ amongst fashion’s wellestablished houses ’is that [resale is] cannibalizing their business.’”169 The
ultimate irony and heart of the luxury paradigm is that luxury is valued for
[https://perma.cc/569M-3QRH]. In a memo from Chanel U.S. President John Galantic to executives, including Chanel’s CEO, Galantic acknowledges that Chanel is not keeping up with its consumers who want to shop for luxury goods online and through secondary websites. Id. In another
document, entitled “The Luxury Fashion Second Hand Market,” a primer on the resale market,
Chanel lists resale as a threat to the brand, and possible means of recourse via legal action to effectively address it. Id.; see also The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury
Brands, FASHION L. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/relationship-between-luxury-re-sale-luxury-brands-is-rocky [https://perma.cc/5DNK-HX4S].
164. Buyback Programs: The Future of the Luxury Market, FASHION L. (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://www.thefashionlaw.com/buyback-programs-the-future-of-the-luxury-market/
[https://
perma.cc/3T4R-KRCJ] (“If their image is tarnished by consumers buying sub-par (or counterfeit)
pre-owned products, that could chip away at brand equity, and ultimately, reflect poorly on their
new goods, thereby, deterring consumers.”).
165. Id.
166. This is especially true should the pre-owned product actually be a counterfeit. In its
lawsuit against TRR, Chanel alleges that TRR marketed and sold at least seven counterfeit Chanel
bags because they were improperly authenticated—prompting Chanel’s declaration that “only Chanel itself can know what is genuine Chanel.” Chanel Complaint, supra note 1, at 11–12.
167. See Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining
that luxury brand “rights holders . . . have obvious economic incentives to curtail the sale of both
counterfeit and authentic goods on the internet – after all, every sale . . . potentially represents a
lost sales opportunity via [the manufacturer’s] own authorized distribution channels.”); see also
Edelson, supra note 163 (revealing that in Chanel’s own documents, the brand discusses the second
hand market as a threat to the brand).
168. See Buyback Programs: The Future of The Luxury Market?, supra note 164; see, e.g.,
Chanel Complaint, supra note 1 (Note that Court dismissed the false affiliation claim pursuant to
TRR’s motion to dismiss); see also, Second Am. Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around
Comes Around, LLC No. 1:18-cv-02253-LLS, 2018 WL 6440647 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) [hereinafter
Second Am. Complaint] (alleging the unauthorized use of Chanel’s trademarks amounted to false
advertising and false association and endorsement under the Lanham Act. Those claims remain
pending in the lawsuit).
169. The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury Brands, FASHION
L. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/relationship-between-luxury-re-sale-luxurybrands-is-rocky [https://perma.cc/5DNK-HX4S] (quoting Julie Wainwright, CEO and Founder of
TRR).
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its timelessness, high quality, and durability—the very characteristics that
give rise to the market that luxury believes undermines it. Concerned about
diverting consumers and diminishing market share, luxury brands too begrudge what appears to be resale sites “leveraging of the appeal and esteem
of the world’s most famous luxury brands and their valuable intellectual
property”170 that luxury brands have spent decades, if not hundreds of years
building, and millions (if not billions) of dollars in marketing and legal fees
maintaining.171 This proves especially true as counterfeiting is running rampant and authentication proves more and more difficult.172

C. Authentication Is Critical to Luxury
Although the proliferation of counterfeiting and resale poses a genuine
threat to luxury brands, the larger issue of authentication is a driving factor.173 Regarded as “the challenge for the luxury segment of our time,”174
authentication stands at the core of “safeguarding the exclusivity for which
the luxury industry stands.”175 Authentication is why luxury brands heavily
invest in protecting their trademarks: brands’ identity and exclusivity hinge
on “ensur[ing] the authenticity and quality – and frankly, the conditions in
which their goods are merchandised and marketed.”176 In luxury’s eyes, a
consumer’s bad experience with a sub-par, pre-owned, or counterfeit product
will negatively impact the brand’s reputation and cause a domino effect in

170. Id.
171. See Roberto Fontana, Stéphane J.G. Girod & Martin Králik, How Luxury Brands Can
Beat Counterfeiters, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 24, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/how-luxurybrands-can-beat-counterfeiters [https://perma.cc/C9SS-YKNE].
172. See generally id.
173. See Hitzler & Müller-Stewens, supra note 14, at 31; see generally Danny Parisi, The
Rise of Authentication Has Curbed the Flow of Counterfeits to Fashion Resellers, GLOSSY (June
6, 2019), https://www.glossy.co/fashion/the-rise-of-authentication-has-curbed-the-flow-of-counterfeits-to-fashion-resellers/ [perma.cc/UDN6-9CJ5].
174. Hitzler & Müller-Stewens, supra note 14, at 31.
175. Id. at 44.
176. Buyback Programs: The Future of the Luxury Market?, supra note 164.
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ultimately casting a shadow on their new collections, which would in turn
deter customers, new and old,177 thanks to social media’s pervasiveness.178
Given the critical role authentication plays in product valuation, it is
ironic that codified authentication standards or definitions of who is capable
of authenticating are lacking in both the luxury and art worlds.179 While the
art world offers generalized “expert” qualification guidelines,180 the luxury

177. See id.
178. While an informal court of public opinion always weighed in on issues, the advent of
social media has turned public opinion into a “diaspora,” where personal opinion has “officially
supplanted data and evidence.” Caitria O’Neill, The New Court of Public Opinion, NIEMAN LAB,
https://www.niemanlab.org/2017/12/the-new-court-of-public-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/R9LBM9GA]. Indeed, social media and related technologies, all of which operate through algorithms,
automation, and data collection and analysis, have “vastly change[d] the scale, scope, and precision
of how information is transmitted in the digital age. Although social media was once heralded as
a force for freedom and democracy, it has increasingly come under scrutiny for its role in amplifying disinformation, inciting violence, and lowering trust in the media and democratic institutions.”
Use of Social Media to Manipulate Public Opinion Now a Global Problem, Says New Report,
OXFORD INTERNET INST. (Sep. 29, 2019), https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news/releases/use-of-socialmedia-to-manipulate-public-opinion-now-a-global-problem-says-new-report/
[https://perma.cc
/UL2B-75XQ] (quoting Samantha Bradshaw).
179. Fake or Real? The Challenge of Product Authentication for Luxury Brands, RETAILER
CHRON. (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.theretailchronicler.com/post/fake-or-real-the-challenge-ofproduct-authentication-for-luxury-brands [https://perma.cc/AVS3-5WT2]; see also Poor Training
and Quotas Threaten The RealReal Pledge of ‘No Fakes’ on Its Site, CNBC (Nov. 5, 2019, 12:45
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/05/cnbc-investigates-poor-training-and-quotas-threaten-therealreals-pledge-of-no-fakes-on-its-site.html [https://perma.cc/3FPL-2T5Z] (noting that authentication is “brand-specific” and unique to each brand). As to art, see The Enduring Challenges of
Authenticating Act, ART CRITIQUE (Mar. 20, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://www.art-critique.com/en
/2020/03/art-authentication-today/ [https://perma.cc/JS7K-83PL].
180. Besides the artist itself, an art “expert” is generally regarded as “[s]omeone who knows
what he or she is talking about and . . . has the experience and resume to prove it,” a relative, former
employee, highly respect, or individuals with “legal[ly] . . . granted entitlements or permission to
pass judgment,” highly respected art community “go-to individuals,” or art authentication firms
/practitioners. Authenticating and Attributing Art: What You Need to Know, ART BUS., https://
www.artbusiness.com/artauth.html [https://perma.cc/MA2R-F647]. The luxury fashion industry,
however, lacks standards for who “can” authenticate and do so for the authentication of luxury
goods. Tyler Clifford, The RealReal CEO Says: ‘We Keep Changing’ to Fend Off Fakes, CNBC
(Nov. 13, 2019, 4:40 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/13/the-realreal-ceo-says-we-keepchanging-to-fend-off-fakes.html [https://perma.cc/54TX-UY3D]. A recurring issue too, in the art
world, art sales (much like luxury, but in most cases, with a far smaller accompanying price tag),
are premised upon authenticity guarantees. Interestingly, the Federal Rules of Evidence section
702 sets forth similar guidelines as to who constitutes an expert, providing that an expert witness
can opine if: (a) its “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient
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world lacks similar articulations that apply across the industry.181 Moreover,
authentication itself is far from an “exact science,”182 and it presents a nowin situation because even when authenticators get it right, it is costly to
prove.183 With a rise in litigation challenging authenticator’s opinions, the
art world lobbied (though unsuccessfully) for legislation limiting authenticator liability to cases where “clear and convincing” evidence demonstrated
an authenticator acted in bad faith.184 In attempting to carve out a good faith
exception to protect authenticators, the art world recognized the necessity,
significance, and weight those opinions carry and sought to protect them by
preserving an industry wholly dependent on them.185
Comparatively, while luxury brands can ensure their goods’ authenticity through tightly controlled initial distribution, it ceases following the first
sale.186 Thereafter, luxury resellers and consumers share luxury brand mark
holders’ interest in ensuring the sale/purchase of an authentic product and
why companies such as TRR, Fashionphile, and VC developed robust authentication teams and processes. Staffed with highly trained luxury

facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”
181. See One of the Most In-Demand Skill Sets in Fashion Right Now? Luxury Authentication, FASHION L. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/one-of-the-most-in-demandskill-sets-in-fashion-right-now-luxury-authentication/ [https://perma.cc/9KAN-PTHK] (noting
that each item is brand specific and that creating authentication standards is often brand and company—not industry—specific.).
182. Danielle Rahm, Warhols, Pollocks, Fakes: Why Art Authenticators Are Running for
the Hills, FORBES (June 18, 2013, 10:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellerahm/2013/06
/18/warhols-pollocks-fakes-why-art-authenticators-are-running-for-the-hills/
[https://perma.cc
/TRB3-7Y55].
183. See id. Indeed, in a case involving the Andy Warhol Foundation, where despite winning every case, it spent over $10 million in defense costs, thereby necessitating its closure. Daniel
Grant, New Legislation Would Protect Art Authenticators Against ‘Nuisance’ Lawsuits, OBSERVER
(June 4, 2014, 1:07 PM), https://observer.com/2014/06/dont-shoot-the-messenger-if-passed-newlegislation-would-protect-art-authenticators-against-nuisance-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/GXL4WGF3]. The same fate befell the Keith Haring Foundation, the Pollock-Krasner Foundation, and
the estates of Pablo Picasso and Jean-Michel Basquiat. Id.
184. Grant, supra note 183.
185. Rahm, supra note 182.
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114; see also, Gilson, supra note 36, at 233.
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experts,187 some of whom must complete 5,200 hours of training just to be
able to authenticate seven luxury brands,188 resellers have staked their business reputations on their authentication programs and authentication guarantees.189
Despite an authenticator’s extensive training, the authentication process, as thorough, detailed and meticulous as it is, is not infallible. Indeed,
authenticators are human and to err is human;190 as previously mentioned,
like art authentication, luxury authentication is not an “exact science”191—at
least not yet.192 It is why Praepitcha Smatsorabudh’s counterfeit luxury
handbag operation earned her over $1 million—plus a thirty month prison
sentence and a $400,000 fine.193 After purchasing authentic luxury handbags
at luxury retailers, Smatsorabudh194 would return nearly identical counterfeit
187. See One of the Most In-Demand Skill Sets in Fashion Right Now? Luxury Authentication, supra note 181.
188. Tyler McCall, Fashionphile is Turning Luxury Authentication Into A Science,
FASHIONISTA (Jan. 31, 2020), https://fashionista.com/2020/01/fashionphile-handbag-authentication-technology [https://perma.cc/LR69-9N4U] (referring to Fashionphile University’s authentication training program’s basic requirements); see also Kaley Roshitsh, Fashionphile University to
Become an App, WWD (July 11, 2019, 10:54 AM), https://wwd.com/fashion-news/fashion-scoops
/fashionphile-to-launch-an-app-1203219002/ [https://perma.cc/GFQ2-K69U].
189. See, e.g., The RealReal Sets the Record Straight on Its Authentication Process, THE
REALREAL (Nov. 12, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/11/12
/1945947/0/en/The-RealReal-Sets-the-Record-Straight-on-Its-Authentication-Process.html
[https://perma.cc/Y8CY-8KU5].
190. Even The RealReal CEO, Julie Wainwright, admitted that to err is human, and that
while The RealReal’s goal is to keep counterfeits out of the marketplace with its top notch, rigorous
authentication process, maybe “.001%” slip through the cracks. Pamela Boykoff, Clare Sebastian
& Masha Angelova, The RealReal CEO Stands Up for the Company’s Authentication Policy, CNN
BUS. (Nov. 29, 2019, 12:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/29/business/realreal-counterfeititems/index.html [https://perma.cc/2DLS-KCQ8].
191. Jane Kallir, Art Authentication Is Not an Exact Science, ART NEWSPAPER (Nov. 23,
2018),
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/comment/art-authentication-is-not-an-exact-science
[https://perma.cc/EX4Z-CNRR].
192. But see McCall, supra note 188 (where Fashionphile’s CEO, Ben Hemminger, believes luxury authentication is “just a science.” His company is using top of the line equipment and
developing its own patented technology to scientifically discern counterfeits from authentic items.).
193. See Arlington Woman Sentenced for Counterfeit Handbag Scheme, supra note 129;
see also Weiner, supra note 129; see also Weinreb, supra note 130.
194. See Arlington Woman Sentenced for Counterfeit Handbag Scheme, supra note 129;
see also Weiner, supra note 129. Interestingly, the Judge in her case noted that the high quality of
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replicas back to the stores where she purchased the originals and sell the
authentic bags on third party platforms for profit.
However, the Chanel Complaint failed to mention that only seven of
tens of thousands of Chanel items authenticated and listed on TRR site were
deemed inauthentic.195 This begs the question: does the problem lie with an
authenticator’s inaptitude or the enhanced aptitude of the counterfeiters
themselves? The answer demonstrates how modern counterfeiting poses unparalleled and unprecedented challenges that render making 100% accurate
authentication decisions more difficult and precarious.

IV. LUXURY BRAND MARK HOLDERS’ ENGAGEMENT IN RESALE IS
LARGELY PREMISED ON ASSERTING RESALE AUTHENTICATION
RIGHTS TO PROTECT THEIR BRAND IDENTITY AND EXCLUSIVITY
With the foundation-undermining challenges that counterfeiting and
resale growth pose to the luxury market, the need for bullet-proof authentication and few avenues of legal recourse available, brands rely almost exclusively on trademark law as they strategically “engage” in resale out of both
opportunity and need. In doing so, luxury brands have approached resale in
varying ways, which include: (1) instituting trademark infringement suits
against resellers; (2) partnering with resale platforms to mutually promote
the brand and circularity/sustainability brand priorities; and (3) bringing resale in-house, by opening brand specific and brand-owned resale stores/platforms.

A. Some Luxury Brands “Engage” in Resale Through Litigation
At one end of the resale engagement spectrum are luxury brands slow
to warm to resale and who opt to fight it tooth-and-nail to secure their brand
exclusivity. For example, Louis Vuitton and Chanel instituted infringement
lawsuits against sellers small and large; Louis Vuitton sued three individuals
convicted of offering counterfeit versions of its clothing, shoes, and handbags on an Alibaba site,196 and Chanel pursued litigation against

counterfeits undoubtedly facilitated her “ingenious” scheme: “I think what you did was ingenious. . . . It’s just stealing, but the Internet has given us so many more ways to steal. . . . I thought
I’d seen everything.” Id.
195. Chanel Complaint, supra note 1, at 11–12.
196. France’s Louis Vuitton Sues Counterfeit Online Sellers in China, REUTERS (Jan. 10,
2016, 7:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-luxury-lawsuit/frances-louis-vuitton-
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unauthorized accessories e-commerce company Shiver and Duke197 for allegedly misappropriating Chanel’s marks by crafting jewelry out of authentic
Chanel hardware198 without proper disclaimers, hoping to capitalize on “‘the
selling power and fame of the Chanel mark.’”199
Luxury brands have also targeted third-party platforms. For instance,
both LVMH200 and Tiffany201 sued third-party internet hosting platforms,
Akanoc202 and eBay, respectively, alleging contributory infringement for
their users’ counterfeit activities.203 Though the courts reached different outcomes in each case,204 luxury brands’ institution of litigation communicated
their intolerance for third-party platforms’ hosting of counterfeiters by attempting to hold them accountable for facilitating counterfeiting on their
platforms.

sues-counterfeit-online-sellers-in-china-idUSKCN0UO0MZ20160110
UA8F].

[https://perma.cc/TJL3-

197. Chanel Is Suing an Accessories Company Over Jewelry Made from Authentic Logo
Bearing Buttons, FASHION L. (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/chanel-is-suingshriver-duke-over-jewelry-made-from-authentic-logo-bearing-buttons/ [https://perma.cc/W4EJLJWP].
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. LVMH also instituted litigation in French courts against eBay, alleging French legal
counterparts to contributory infringement under U.S. law. See Ellie Mercado, Note, As Long as
“It” Is Not Counterfeit: Holding eBay Liable for Secondary Trademark Infringement in the Wake
of LVMH and Tiffany Inc., 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 115, 127–28 (2010).
201. Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
202. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols., 658 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2011).
203. See id.
204. The differing outcomes turned on whether the platform had specific knowledge of the
infringing activity occurring on its platforms. In Tiffany, the court sided with eBay, holding that
because eBay merely served as a host platform, without any specific knowledge that counterfeit
goods were sold, eBay could not be liable for infringement. See Tiffany Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at
508. In contrast, the LVMH court held the web host company liable because unlike eBay in the
Tiffany case, it had not only control, but actual knowledge of the infringing behavior. See Louis
Vuitton Malletier, S.A., 658 F.3d at 940, 947.
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In addition to LVMH, Tiffany, and Kering,205 Chanel also “engaged”
in resale through instituting litigation to police its marks and preserve its exclusivity against e-reseller Fashionphile in 2014 and both vintage reseller
What Goes Around Comes Around206 and e-consignment retailer TRR207 in
2018. Therein, Chanel sought to bolster its brand exclusivity claims by asserting that its strict, limited distribution through its own retail stores and
designated high-end prestigious specialty stores208 is “the only way to ensure
that [consumers] are in fact receiving genuine Chanel products.”209 However, in its Complaint against TRR, Chanel took it a step further in declaring
that “[o]nly Chanel itself can know what is genuine Chanel.”210
On its face, Chanel’s self-serving and self-preserving proclamation is
justifiably viewed by its litigation adversaries as a “thinly-veiled effort to
stop consumers from reselling their authentic used goods,”211 and to engage
in an “overarching competitive scheme” to “inhibit. . .and impair the growth
and development of innovative resale rivals…who threaten Chanel’s dominance.”212 After investing millions into managing and controlling every

205. Kering originally sued Alibaba alleging various counterfeiting claims but dropped the
suit in favor of partnering with Alibaba to fight counterfeiting across its platform. See Paul Mozur,
In Fight Against Fakes, Alibaba and Owner of Gucci Go from Adversaries to Partners, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/business/alibaba-kering-fakes-luxury.html
[https://perma.cc/BHC4-KHEC].
206. See generally, Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC,
1:18-cv-02253-LLS (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 14, 2018) [hereinafter What Goes Around Comes
Around Complaint].
207. See generally, Chanel Complaint, supra note 1.
208. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 168, at 5; Chanel Complaint, supra note 1,
at 8.
209. What Goes Around Comes Around Complaint, supra note 206, at 11; Chanel Complaint, supra note 1, at 9.
210. Chanel Complaint, supra note 1, at 11.
211. Chanel and The RealReal Both Nab Wins in Latest Round of Ongoing Counterfeit
Lawsuit, FASHION L. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/chanel-the-realreal-bothnab-wins-in-latest-round-of-ongoing-counterfeit-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/FW3D-SGWC].
212. Chanel Is Maintaining a “Monopoly” with the Help of Big-Name Retailers, Publishers, The RealReal Claims in New Filing, FASHION L. (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/chanel-is-maintaining-a-monopoly-with-the-help-of-big-name-retailers-publishersthe-realreal-claims-in-new-filing/ [https://perma.cc/7ZME-GTYF].
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detail of the brand, from its tight distribution and strict quality control to its
marketing and boutique product experience, it is understandable why Chanel
views resale as a threat. However, the ripple effect stemming from its assertion effectively undermines not only any reseller or third-party expert authenticator’s ability to authenticate Chanel, but that of other luxury brands
who did not voice similar concerns or objections regarding their need to authenticate their marked products on resale. Chanel’s statement effectively
restrains a consumer’s ability to freely alienate its Chanel product as Chanel
implied that unless a consumer obtains Chanel’s authentication determination/blessing on resale, even an authentic Chanel product, bought at a Chanel
boutique, may be deemed inauthentic if not authenticated on resale. Construed in its most unfavorable light, even though Chanel’s statement elicits
monopoly and antitrust implications,213 Chanel remains seemingly steadfast
(at least outwardly) in its approach to resale214 and to litigation as a means of
overall brand protection.215

213. Discovery in the WGACA litigation revealed documents evidencing that Chanel had
engaged in anti-competitive behavior against The RealReal. Indeed, Chanel allegedly threatened
to pull its products from such retailers unless they made immediate changes to the programs and
partnerships with The RealReal, thereby directly interfering with The RealReal’s contracts and
business endeavors. Documents further revealed that Chanel had allegedly also interfered with The
RealReal’s advertising opportunities with a variety of fashion publications, including New York
Magazine, Vogue, and the New York Times. These documents supported The RealReal’s theory
that Chanel had engaged in antitrust behavior at worst, and tortious interference with contract and
prospective business advantage at best, prompting The RealReal to move to and eventually amend
its answer to include these counterclaims. See Edelson, supra note 163; see also First Am. Answer
at 18–19, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, No. 1:18-CV-10626 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Feb. 25, 2021).
214. On or about April 5, 2021, Chanel, Inc. and The RealReal stipulated to a three month
stay of the case in favor of mediation. See Joint Stipulation & Ord., supra note 1, at 1.
215. In discovery produced in the WGACA litigation, documents revealed not only that
Chanel views the secondhand market as a threat, but that “legal action” is the “brand strategy” to
address “the diversion of products to . . . undesirable channels.” Edelson, supra note 163. Therein,
Chanel notes that in the last three years, Chanel in the U.S. has targeted the secondhand industry
with “three lawsuits and 15 cease and desist letters for trademark violations such as false association, false endorsement, false sponsorship, and unfair competition.” Id. Moreover, even prior to
the filing of the WGACA and TRR cases, between 2009 and 2017, Chanel filed almost 400 trademark litigation cases and recouped over $1 billion dollars in damages. Trevor Little, Chanel Bursts
Through $1 Billion Damages Barrier as Coach Revealed as Top US Trademark Litigation Filer,
WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-counterfeiting/chanel-bursts-through-1-billion-damages-barrier-coach-revealed-top-us
[https://
perma.cc/HBY4-52CY]; see also Rachel Bailey, Copyright and Trademark Litigation Report 2021,
LEX MACHINA (June 2021), https://pages.lexmachina.com/rs/098-SHZ-498/images/Lex_Machina
_Copyright_and_Trademark_Litigation_Report_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9CY-GE6E] (listing
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B. Other Luxury Brands “Partner” With Resellers to Ensure
Products’ Authenticity in Resale Commerce
Alternatively, other luxury mark holding brands opted to “partner” with
established e-commerce resellers. A pioneer in this area, The RealReal initially paved the way for such partnerships. TRR’s and Stella McCartney’s
partnership216 was one of the first of its kind, and it mutually promoted the
companies’ shared sustainability and circularity goals. As retailers became
more and more interested in resale (likely in response to consumers’ interest
therein)217 subsequent partnerships served as opportunities to test the resale
waters, like Burberry’s limited TRR partnership.218 However, by late 2019
and early 2020, and after seeing the rapid growth of luxury resale and resale
companies’ initial public offerings,219 luxury brands recognized not just the

Chanel as the eighth most active trademark litigator, having filed 70 trademark cases between 2018
and 2020; and the only luxury brand to have made the top ten).
216. See Mario Abad, Why The RealReal and Stella McCartney Are Calling for Luxury
Brands to Embrace Reselling, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2018, 7:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/marioabad/2018/04/19/realreal-stella-mccartney/ [https://perma.cc/T84C-PS82]. The brands’ mutual desire to make “a positive impact and advance our shared values [of] sustainability and the
promotion of the circular economy in luxury fashion,” rewarded consignors of Stella McCartney
products with The RealReal with a $100 shopping credit at Stella McCartney. The RealReal x
Stella McCartney, REALREAL, https://promotion.therealreal.com/stellamccartney/ [https://
perma.cc/4RXR-36BN].
217. In 2019, resale grew 25% faster than retail alone. See 2020 Resale Report, THREDUP,
https://www.thredup.com/resale/2020/#resale-growth [https://perma.cc/VJ2T-Q5ZD]. While the
resale market value was negligible in 2009, it was valued at $7 billion in 2019, and is estimated to
increase in value over six fold to over $44 billion by 2029. Id. This increase is in response to
consumer demand and interest in secondhand, as ThredUp’s 2021 report reveals. Indeed, with over
43% of consumers interested in purchasing only from retailers who are engaged in the secondhand
market, a corresponding 60% of retailers expressed interest in partnering with existing resale retailers. 2021 Resale Report, supra note 146.
218. Maghan McDowell, Burberry’s Partnership with The RealReal Signifies a Real Shift,
VOGUE BUS. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.voguebusiness.com/companies/burberrys-partnershiprealreal-secondhand [https://perma.cc/WNY4-FUUE] (Burberry says this “partnership is part of a
five-year strategy that includes finding new uses for waste and becoming carbon neutral . . . [as]
the brand is looking at ways to disrupt the linear production model in a push towards circularity”);
see Sarah Kent, Burberry Partners with The RealReal to Tap Fast-Growing Resale Market, BUS.
OF FASHION (Oct. 7, 2019, 5:20 AM), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/retail/burberrypartners-with-the-realreal-to-tap-fast-growing-resale-market [https://perma.cc/T9ZB-G9MF].
219. The RealReal filed to go public on May 31, 2019, and raised over $300 million in its
initial public offering. Glenda Toma, The RealReal IPO: First Startup from Resale’s New Wave to
Go Public Sees Shares Soar, FORBES (June 28, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
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opportunity but the need to engage in resale as a means of exerting control
in a market selling their branded goods over which they had little to no control or involvement.220 What consequently followed included Gucci’s brand
partnership with TRR in October 2020, whereby Gucci launched its own
online consignments shop with TRR, selling both its own archival and preworn pieces sourced from Gucci itself, as well as consigned pieces the brand
“curated daily.”221 Gucci’s “partnership” reflects not only its desire to directly engage in the secondary resale market (an engagement whose rewards,
the brand states, “outweigh the risks”222), but its need to manage its brand on
a major second hand reseller site to evaluate the interaction between “second-hand shoppers and its products.”223
Alexander McQueen’s recent “partnership” with VC shared these objectives. Through the “Brand Approved program,” Alexander McQueen solicits second-hand items from its most valued and trusted customers, which
the brand authenticates and lists for sale on VC’s platform.224 While
“put[ting] brands directly in control of pre-owned or vintage items,”225 these
“partnerships” allow luxury brands to not only engage in resale, but to police
their marks, ultimately controlling and overseeing which marked goods enter
resale.226 Effectively, these partnerships directly position luxury brands as
/glendatoma/2019/06/28/the-realreal-ipo-luxury-reseller-latest-retailer-to-go-public/?sh=
1e6e71a26289 [https://perma.cc/9TY5-55WJ].
220. See Vikram Alexei Kansara, Should Luxury Build Resale Into its Business Model?,
BUS. OF FASHION (Oct. 9, 2020, 3:12 PM), https://www.businessoffashion.com/briefings/luxury
/should-luxury-build-resale-into-its-business-model [https://perma.cc/MLE6-HT7B].
221. Luisa Zargani, Gucci Partners with The RealReal, WWD (Oct. 5, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://wwd.com/fashion-news/designer-luxury/gucci-the-realreal-1234618857/ [https://perma.cc
/WX2F-KJCG].
222. Kansara, supra note 220.
223. Id.
224. Theodosi, supra note 159.
225. Id.
226. Luxury brands, such as Valentino and Ferragamo, partnered with third-party platforms, such as Amazon, to fight counterfeiting on the latter’s sites and platforms. See Ruiqi Chen,
Amazon Taps DOJ Prosecutor, Helps 3M, Valentino Fight Fake Goods, BLOOMBERG L. (July 8,
2020, 2:56 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/ip-law/ [https://perma.cc
/Q6UH-JCTM]. As did Kering, in dismissing its own trademark infringement suit against Alibaba,
to join Alibaba’s “Big Data Anti-counterfeiting Alliance,” recognizing that “the only way [brands]
. . . can win this war is to unite” in using pools brands’ data and resources in tandem with Alibaba’s
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gatekeepers to resale, allowing their exercise of resale authentication
rights—rights that may ultimately have unintended consequences should
these “partnerships” continue.

C. Some Luxury Brands Opt to “Own” Their Own Resale
Lastly, at the opposite end of the resale engagement spectrum, luxury
brands, and most recently, luxury conglomerates, have dove head-first into
resale by “owning” their own resale.227 For instance, luxury brands like
leather handbags and accessories atelier, Mark Cross, and watchmaker,
Richard Mille, brought their resale business in-house, the latter having
opened three retail stores offering certified pre-owned watches.228 Others,
such as Kering, acquired financial stakes in existing third-party resellers; indeed, on the heels of Alexander McQueen’s announcement of a partnership
with VC, luxury conglomerate Kering, which owns Alexander McQueen,
announced its acquisition of a minority stake in Vestiaire Collective.229
While some regard Kering’s investment as an indication that “luxury’s attitude to the second-hand model could be thawing,” given that “[s]uccessful
luxury labels usually seek to tightly control where products are sold and for

anti-counterfeiting algorithms to police counterfeiting on Alibaba’s platform. Maria Bobila, Chinese Retail Giant Alibaba Launches ‘Big Data Anti-Counterfeiting Alliance’ with Louis Vuitton,
Swarovski and More, FASHIONISTA (Jan. 16, 2017), https://fashionista.com/2017/01/alibaba-anticounterfeit-alliance [https://perma.cc/UCR8-FQT6]. Even third-party marketplaces like Etsy are
eager for a piece of the resale market, as reflected by their recent acquisition of Depop, a resale site
that “is a little bit Ebay and a little bit Instagram.” Taylor Lorenz, Why Teens Are Selling Clothes
Out of Their Closets, ATLANTIC (June 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive
/2019/06/depop-live-selling-clothes-influencers/591595/ [https://perma.cc/7Z84-Q522]; see Etsy
to Acquire Global Fashion Resale Marketplace Depop, ETSY (June 2, 2021), https://investors.etsy.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2021/Etsy-to-acquire-global-fashion-resale-marketplace-Depop/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8TPY-L2QS].
227. Indeed, luxury brands’ ownership of their own resale is emerging of late as the way
luxury brands can “close the loop.” Avery Booker, Brand-Owned Resale Could Finally “Close the
Loop” for Luxury, JING DAILY (Apr. 23, 2021), https://jingdaily.com/could-brand-owned-resalefinally-close-the-loop-for-luxury/ [https://perma.cc/3EHH-5XB7].
228. See Kati Chitrakorn, Why Luxury Fashion Brands Should Offer Resale, VOGUE BUS.
(Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.voguebusiness.com/sustainability/should-luxury-fashion-brands-offer-resale-richard-mille-mark-cross-do [https://perma.cc/5RUZ-4HFR].
229. See generally Cathaleen Chen, Vestiaire Collective Announces Resale Partnership
with Alexander McQueen, BUS. OF FASHION (Feb. 16, 2021, 12:03 AM), https://www.businessoffashion.com/news/retail/vestiaire-collective-announces-resale-partnership-with-alexandermcqueen [https://perma.cc/4JDF-MNX2].
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how much,”230 Kering “seize[d] the opportunity”231 to own its resale e-commercially, and effectively, to control the resale commerce streams that sell
its marked goods.
Despite very public pronouncements to the contrary,232 in the vein of
thou “doth protest too much,”233 even Chanel has silently entered the resale
space in this capacity. Indeed, recent reports disclosed that Chanel inked a
2018 deal with Farfetch to jointly develop a digital dressing room,234 which
too quietly debuted in January 2020. However, what contemporaneous reports did not reveal was that the Chanel deal with Farfetch also included its
acquisition of a minority stake in Farfetch235 and emerged only one month
before Chanel instituted litigation against WGACA and ten months before
Chanel sued TRR alleging infringement, counterfeiting, unfair competition,
false advertising, and other general business law claims for their resale of
Chanel on TRR’s site.236 In May 2020, Farfetch’s new resale venture, Second Life,237 emerged. It featured an exclusive pre-owned Chanel 49 piece

230. Williams, supra note 5.
231. Kering Leads $216 Million Funding Round for French Resale Platform Vestiaire
Collective, FASHION L. (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/gucci-owner-kering-leads216-million-funding-for-french-resale-platform-vestiaire-collective/
[https://perma.cc/47PNUEWL].
232. See Diderich & Theodosi, supra note 101 (where Chanel declared “we will stay away
from that secondhand market.”).
233. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2, l. 215.
234. Press Release, Farfetch, Chanel and Farfetch Sign Exclusive Innovative Partnership
(Feb. 19, 2018), https://aboutfarfetch.com/news/press-releases/chanel-and-farfetch/ [https://
perma.cc/GE9N-6P57].
235. White & Denis, supra note 162. Indeed, while several European news sources picked
up the story, few, if any, US news outlets reported it as my research (didn’t) reveal. Indeed, the
acquisition became publicly known after discovery in the Chanel v. WGACA case yielded documents disclosing the deal. Note also that in November 2020, Richemont and Alibaba too invested
in Farfetch. See A Running Timeline of Fashion and Luxury Mergers, Acquisitions, and Investments, FASHION L. (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/a-running-timeline-of-fashion-and-luxury-mergers-acquisitions/ [https://perma.cc/63HB-28W5].
236. See generally What Goes Around Comes Around Complaint, supra note 206; see generally Chanel Complaint, supra note 1.
237. See Godfrey Deeny, Chanel Panning to Roll Out its Farfetch Augmented Retail Experience Project in New Stores, FASHION NETWORK (Jan. 30, 2020), https://us.fashionnetwork.com
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“treasure trove”238 collection from an acclaimed client, as well as certified
“Pre-Owned Chanel” clothing on Farfetch’s retail site.239 While documents
revealed that Chanel sent Farfetch a cease and desist letter in November 2018
detailing similar allegations (even though the alleged purchase closed in February 2018),240 Chanel opted not to pursue any legal action against
Farfetch.241 However, Chanel’s seemingly selective involvement in resale—
whether by action, omission, or both—and through purchasing a stake in
Farfetch further evidences that even the upper echelon of luxury brands, and
those perhaps more resistant to resale, recognize the need for resale involvement and perhaps have overlooked the unintended consequences in how they
choose to do it.242

D. Luxury Brands Resale Involvement Effectively Adds Resale
Authentication Rights to the Trademark Bundle, Eliciting Unintended

/news/Chanel-planning-to-roll-out-its-farfetch-augmented-retail-experience-project-in-newstores,1181543.html [https://perma.cc/WVR5-GBUB].
238. Glendinning, supra note 162. Indeed, many of the pieces are rare collectibles from
the French design house, and include pieces worn by the house’s muses, including Ines de la
Fressange, Yasmin Le Bon, and Claudia Schiffer. Id.
239. See Pre-Owned Chanel for Women, FARFETCH, https://www.farfetch.com/shopping
/women/designer-chanel-pre-owned/items.aspx [https://perma.cc/R5SV-D83D].
240. See First Am. Answer, at 36, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422,
No. 1:18-CV-10626 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 25, 2021).
241. See Sharon Edelson, The RealReal Cites Antitrust Concerns in Counterclaim to Chanel Lawsuit, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2021, 4:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sharonedelson/2021
/02/01/the-realreal-cites-antitrust-concerns-in-counterclaim-to-chanel-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc
/569M-3QRH]. Indeed, Chanel stated that in lieu of pursuing its claims against Farfetch, “[g]iven
the existing relationship between Farfetch and Chanel, we will pick up the contents of the letter
with Chanel directly.” Letter from Karen L. Dunn, Attorney Representing Defendant The
RealReal, to The Hon. Gabriel W. Gorenstein, U.S. Dist. Ct. Judge for the S.D.N.Y. (Oct. 30, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/ECS8-A3VM].
242. See The RealReal Files Anti-Competition Counterclaims Against Chanel in Ongoing
Legal Battle, FASHION L. (Feb. 26, 2021), https://thefashionlaw.com/with-court-approval-therealreal-files-anti-competition-counterclaims-agaainst-chanel-in-ongoing-legal-battle/
[https://
perma.cc/5J2E-PBK9] (“Chanel’s alleged decision to file this case [against TRR]—and others like
it—’as a means to push [TRR] and other competitors out of the market’ because it views them as a
threat to its ability to maintain a monopoly in the market for ‘top tier investment grade handbags.’”).
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Consequences that Contravene Trademark Law
Despite their need to ensure brand survival through the preservation of
brand exclusivity, luxury brands’ attempts to gain control over their marked
goods in resale may ultimately do more harm than good. Though patently
innocuous in theory, luxury partnerships with resellers in practice constitute
back door entries to resale gate-keeping roles, whereby luxury brands are
afforded opportunities to exercise authentication rights and control over
which marked goods enter resale. The same concern arises when considering luxury’s “ownership” in third-party resale. When luxury brands purchase minority ownership shares in third-party resellers, luxury brands acquire opportunities to exert influence over resale, and not just over which
marked goods enter resale, but which channels they enter. To preserve brand
exclusivity or police infringement, luxury brands sue resellers, as in the case
of Chanel against WGACA and TRR, challenging their ability—or anyone
other than the brand’s ability—to authenticate their branded goods.243 Naturally, the practical effect of this undermines any non-brand authentication,
rendering it a counterfeit in the brands’ eyes.244 From this flows the unintended consequences that effectively prevent consumers from alienating
their goods as they see fit.245 Not only do luxury’s words and actions abridge
the Lanham Act’s clear durational boundaries set by the first sale doctrine,
but they also contravene the Lanham Act’s legislative intent.
Indeed, the Lanham Act’s drafters specifically contemplated and ultimately rejected draft language that afforded mark holders control over their
goods in resale for fear of the implications elicited by what seemingly lies at
the core of Chanel’s declarations: creating a monopoly by conferring durationally limitless, exclusive rights to enforce one’s mark.246 Unfortunately
for Chanel, the choice to pursue WGACA and TRR to the exclusion of
Farfetch—a company in which it owns a minority stake—bolsters TRR’s
243. See, e.g., Chanel Complaint, supra note 1, at 13 (“Only Chanel itself can know what
is genuine Chanel.”).
244. See, e.g., id. at 12–13.
245. “The rights associated with . . . ownership offer assurances of autonomy, persistence,
and simplicity. If consumers are not treated as the owners of [what]they purchase, but . . . are
subject to changing whims of the [IP] holders who can restrict otherwise lawful uses or deny access
altogether, more consumers will simply opt out.” Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling
Intellectual and Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1221–22 (2015) (discussing
copyright and the first sale doctrine).
246. See supra, note 78.
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allegations and critics’ assertions that Chanel seeks to de-legitimize and curtail third-party resale in favor its own exclusively owned and controlled resale channels, perhaps unintentionally.247
With the recent veil of antitrust scrutiny shrouding business enterprise’s expansion plans and operations,248 luxury brand mark holders’ continued resale trajectory in this regard can—and has—shone the “bad” monopoly and antitrust spotlight on luxury brands’ resale based, brand
protection activities. Indeed, TRR lodged those very accusations against
Chanel as a result of its selective litigation strategies and allegedly anti-competitive behavior.249 While their involvement in resale is inevitable, luxury
brands need to alter their approach to resale and their means of engagement
therewith through alternative business approaches. Moreover, they should
consider lobbying for legislative and legal measures that will afford brands
247. Note that Farfetch designates its used Chanel items on resale as authorized “PreOwned Chanel”—a term Chanel argued constituted trademark infringement in its lawsuit against
WGACA when WGACA used such terms on its website. See, e.g., Pre-Owned Chanel Bags for
Women, supra note 239.
248. See Amazon, Apple at the Center of Italian Antitrust Probe for Allegedly Preventing
Unauthorized Parties from Reselling Products, FASHION L. (July 23, 2020), https://thefashionlaw.com/amazon-apple-are-at-the-center-of-italian-antitrust-probe-for-allegedly-preventingunauthorized-parties-from-reselling-products/ [https://perma.cc/NM9N-D2LM]; see also Kait Bolongaro, Amazon ‘Abuse of Dominance’ Concerns Trigger Probe in Canada, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
14, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-14/canada-competitionbureau-probes-amazon-for-abuse-of-dominance-kdudbgwl?srnd=technology-vp [https://perma.cc
/2GPE-SCPA]; see also Cheng Leng, Keith Zhai & David Kirton, Exclusive: China Preparing an
Antitrust Investigation into Google - Sources, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2020, 2:33 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-google-china-huawei-tech-exclusive/exclusive-china-preparing-anantitrust-investigation-into-google-sources-idUSKBN26L1OH
[https://perma.cc/2ZFS-N9EP];
see also EU Seeks New Powers to Penalize Tech Giants: FT, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2020, 9:50 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-tech-breton/eu-seeks-new-powers-to-penalize-tech-giantsft-idUSKCN26B062 [https://perma.cc/WVC7-7HLV] (discussing the EU’s interest in arming itself
with powers to penalize big technology companies, which would force their dismantling or the sale
of some of their European operations if their market dominance threatens the interests of customers
and smaller rivals).
249. See, e.g., First Am. Answer, at 28–32, 34–36, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449
F. Supp. 3d 422, No. 1:18-CV-10626 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 25, 2021) (where TRR alleges, in support of its unclean hands affirmative defense, that Chanel engaged in monopolistic, anti-competitive behavior by: (1) tortiously interfering with TRR’s third-party contracts; (2) tortiously interfering with TRR’s advertising in third-party fashion publications; and (3) refraining from suing
Farfetch, a company in which Chanel owns a minority stake, for identical conduct and advertising
Chanel accuses both WGACA and TRR of in respective suits Chanel instituted against them). As
noted, the case has been stayed, per joint stipulation in favor of mediation. See generally Joint
Stipulation and Order, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, No. 1:18-CV-10626
(S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 5, 2021).
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more strategic and effective recourse against counterfeiters and positioning
to better protect themselves and their market in the face of future Lanham
Act challenges.

V. THE RESALE LUXURY MARKET SHOULD ADOPT LEGISLATIVE,
LEGAL AND BUSINESS SOLUTIONS TO WITHSTAND LUXURY BRANDS’
CHALLENGES
A. Luxury Resellers Must Advocate for a Safe Harbor Amendment to
the Lanham Act
To better reflect resellers’ investment in authentication processes and
infrastructure and the current state of trademark law itself, resellers must advocate for a safe harbor amendment to the Lanham Act. Because business
reputations250 and success hinge on the authenticity of the goods they sell,251
luxury brands and resellers alike know the immense toll counterfeiting’s
rampant proliferation in tandem with e-commercial growth and expansion
has taken. Also, because today’s counterfeits’ quality rivals those of authentic luxury goods, even a trained eye can be deceived—and sometimes even
the luxury brand itself.252 These factors prompted modern resellers to wholly
integrate robust authentication programs replete with highly trained in-house
authenticators253 who stay abreast of developments by re-evaluating and redeveloping254 their multi-point inspection protocols and techniques.
250. See How We Look at Authentication, FASHIONPHILE, https://www.fashionphile.com
/authenticity/page [https://perma.cc/7CAR-BT6F]; see also Danielle Peluso, Vestiaire Collective
Review, HONEST BRAND REVS. (Feb. 14, 2021), https://www.honestbrandreviews.com/reviews
/vestiaire-collective-review/ [https://perma.cc/6HAR-JYGS] (declaring “[a]uthenticity guaranteed”); see also Authenticity Guarantee, WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND, https://
www.whatgoesaroundnyc.com/authenticity-guarantee.html [https://perma.cc/9K4S-Q7SD] (“Authenticity Guaranteed”).
251. See Clifford, supra note 180.
252. With the “proliferation of ‘superfakes’—counterfeit bags so high in quality that they
look real even to professionals—it’s increasingly possible for knockoffs to slip through the
cracks. . . . It’s even possible for an authentic bag to be deemed inauthentic, and for customers to
unwittingly purchase fakes from even the most seemingly trustworthy sources.” Dhani Mau, Can
Technology Keep Fake Handbags Out of the Marketplace?, FASHIONISTA (June 6, 2019), https://
fashionista.com/2019/06/entrupy-luxury-handbag-authentication
[https://perma.cc/XN5MAW2K].
253. See, e.g., Mccall, supra note 188; see also How We Look at Authentication, supra note
250.
254. Indeed, TRR reported that as a result of evolving counterfeiting technologies and
methodologies, their processes are constantly too evolving in response, allowing them to stay
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Resellers such as Vestiaire,255 Fashionphile,256 WGACA,257 and TRR258
boldly guarantee the authenticity of the goods they resell as a result of their
programs and the authentication determinations they render. With recent
valuations in the billions,259 it serves everyone’s best interest—resellers, consumers and the luxury brands alike—to get it right, lest they be tried in the
court of public opinion260 and often in a court of law. As such, resellers
acting in good faith by undertaking the authentication efforts should not be
subjected to strict liability and its penalties or prosecution because it seems
counterintuitive to subject those who undertake good faith authentication efforts to the same standard as those who flagrantly disregard or knowingly
introduce counterfeits into commerce. Given that “super fakes” deceive
even luxury brands,261 the law should afford resellers safe harbor when or if
a counterfeit slips through the cracks.
Additionally, affording a safe harbor provision also reflects current
trends in trademark law whereby liability is premised on intent and not strict

abreast and even get ahead of counterfeiters by employing AI technology. See Clifford, supra note
180.
255. See Meet Our Authentication Experts, VESTIAIRE COLLECTIVE (May 5, 2017), https://
us.vestiairecollective.com/journal/meet-our-authentication-experts/ [https://archive.is/eLlN6].
256. See How We Look at Authentication, supra note 250.
257. See WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND, https://www.whatgoesaroundnyc.com/
[https://perma.cc/A2ST-CX39].
258. See What Is The RealReal’s Authentication Process?, THE REALREAL (Feb. 18, 2021,
7:35
AM),
https://therealreal.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360000084107-What-is-TheRealReal-s-authentication-process- [https://perma.cc/CG74-5MD4].
259. See Romain Dillet, Vestiaire Collective Raises $216 Million for its Second-Hand
Fashion Platform, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 2, 2021, 7:47 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2021/03/02
/vestiaire-collective-raises-216-million-for-its-second-hand-fashion-platform/
[https://perma.cc
/L9XT-9L82].
260. See, e.g., Richard Kestenbaum, The RealReal Sold Me a $3,600 Fake; Here’s Why
Counterfeits Slip Through Its Authentication Process, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2019, 7:05 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/richardkestenbaum/2019/10/23/if-fake-bags-are-being-sold-on-therealreal-how-can-the-resale-business-ever-succeed/ [https://perma.cc/JPK3-LGSN].
261. See Mau, supra note 126.
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liability.262 The two most recent amendments to the Lanham Act, namely
the FDTA and ACPA, premise liability on finding willful intent to trade on
the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of the mark263 or in “bad faith,”
which “shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the
person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the
domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful,”264 respectively. Even in
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Congress effectively designed a
safe harbor provision first by evaluating whether the defendant (1) “‘intentionally’ trafficked in particular goods or services; and [2] ‘knowingly’ used
a counterfeit mark in connection with those goods and services,” where “intentional” requires proof that “the defendant trafficked in the goods or services in question, deliberately, or ‘on purpose.’”265 Congress’ language relative to previous enactments reflects an evolved perspective and enhanced
understanding that liability should be conditioned only where evidence of
bad faith exists in creating a safe harbor precluding liability where good faith
is demonstrated.266

B. Resellers Should Lobby for a Trademark Counterpart to the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Resellers can further protect themselves by lobbying267 for a trademark
counterpart to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The
262. See Innovation Ventures, LLC, v. Ultimate One Distrib. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 3d 137,
156 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
263. FTDA, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); ACPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) for a list of factors the court considers in determining whether bad faith underlies
the party’s action.
264. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
265. 130 CONG. REC. H12076-77, 12076 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement on trademark
counterfeiting legislation); see 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a). Note that the Trademark Counterfeiting Act
of 1984’s safe harbor provision did not confer immunity from prosecution under the Lanham Act
as the latter remains a strict liability. 130 CONG. REC. H12076-77, 12077 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984)
(statement on trademark counterfeiting legislation) (Indeed, a Lanham Act amendment affording a
safe harbor provisions in cases evidencing good faith would better align the statutes’ application
and purview).
266. See 130 CONG. REC. H12076-77, 12077 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement on trademark counterfeiting legislation).
267. To affect desired change, the fashion industry overall needs a stronger and larger lobby
presence in Washington. In 2019, with a team of 40 lobbyists, LVMH, Kering, and PVH together
spent a total of $320 thousand on lobbying efforts directed at counterfeiting and trade regulations.
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DMCA amended the Copyright Act to enhance copyright owners’ protection
as a result of increasing online infringement and counterfeiting; and address
“the legal uncertainty facing the nascent internet industry resulting from
online services providers’ potential legal liability for copyright infringement
that occurred on their services.”268 Most significantly, it afforded legal certainty vis a vis safe harbors for online service providers “in exchange for
cooperating with copyright owners to expeditiously remove infringing content if the online services providers promptly notified offenders and removed
infringing materials.”269
Like copyright holders, trademark holders should similarly be afforded
protection. The internet has facilitated counterfeiting’s exponential growth
at a previously unprecedented rate, and whose quality now rivals those of
authentic luxury goods. With “super fakes”270 that deceive even the experts,
offering counterfeit goods for sale is becoming more commonplace and
harder to detect or differentiate—unlike in copyright cases, where ascertaining the infringement is quite definitive.271 Affording resellers acting in good
faith a safe harbor ensures consistent application of the law, levels the playing field across intellectual property disciplines, and promotes judicial economy.

C. Resellers Must Push to Codify the First Sale Doctrine in a
This pales in comparison to the tech lobby: that same year, Facebook alone spent over $20 million
on lobbying in Washington and the Big Four, namely Google, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon, spent
$55 million with a team of over 238 lobbyists. Fashion needs a seat at the table not only to have
its interests represented and to advocate for policy and legislative change, but also to weigh in on
tech, trade, and environmental policy (among others). See Kellie Eli, Political Contributions:
Fashion’s Heavy Hitters Support Candidates With Cash, WWD (Oct. 6, 2020), https://wwd.com
/business-news/government-trade/political-contributions-fashion-designers-executives-candidatecontributions-1234619501/ [https://perma.cc/4T38-FTAX]; see also Cecilia Kang & Kenneth P.
Vogel, Tech Giants Amass a Lobbying Army for an Epic Washington Battle, N.Y. TIMES (June 5,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/us/politics/amazon-apple-facebook-google-lobbying.html [https://perma.cc/P4VM-VFAQ]; see also Ruff, supra note 125.
268. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/dmca/ [https://perma.cc/7STV-YAY9].
269. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 512; see also Sloane, supra note 102, at 1207.
270. Mau, supra note 126.
271. See generally Copyright in General, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-general.html [https://perma.cc/T872-CNSJ]; see generally Trademark, Patent, or Copyright, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics
/trademark-patent-copyright# [https://perma.cc/V3BJ-SSCF].
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Provision of the Lanham Act
Finally, codifying the first sale doctrine in a Lanham Act amendment
will further insulate resellers from infringement suits. Unlike copyright law,
the first sale doctrine as applied to trademark law is one of judicial construct.272 Courts apply the doctrine differently; while some courts regard it
as an affirmative defense, others regard it as an element of a plaintiffs’
claim.273 Without a consistent means of application, the law remains riddled
with jurisdictional inconsistencies, which promote forum shopping and confusion for those who bear the burden of proof.274 Codification would not
only eradicate such inconsistencies but better cement the doctrine in trademark law.

D. Resellers’ Implementation of Various Business Solutions Can
Further Protect Them Against Infringement Allegations and
Lawsuits
In addition to legislative amendments, there are various business solutions resellers should consider going forward. First, resellers should develop
their own proprietary authentication technology to distinguish counterfeits
from authentic luxury. In the current supply chain, luxury brands typically
rely on quality, craftsmanship, and country or origin as sourcing criteria.275
Their knowledge and understanding of the materials are superficial and high
level, premised on the touch and feel of buttery leathers, the rigor of the canvas, general composition and hue of the dyes, the striations in the hides, and
durability of the thread and hardware.276

272. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (codifying the first sale doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976);
15 U.S.C. § 1 (where there is no mention of the first sale doctrine); see also Gilson, supra note 36,
at 233–34 (reiterating that the first sale doctrine/defense in trademark law is judicially created and
interpreted).
273. See Kurtis A. Kemper, Construction and Application of “First Sale Doctrine” in
Trademark Law, 71 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, 6 (2013).
274. See generally Mark Moller, The Checks and Balances of Forum Shopping, 1 STAN. J.
(2012).

OF COMPLEX LITIG. 107

275. See 6 ‘Must Have’ Features That Make Luxury Brands So Special, SO, https://
www.socreative.co.uk/how-to-create-a-luxury-brand/ [https://perma.cc/2YED-TZ98].
276. See generally Federico Caniato et al., Supply Chain Management in the Luxury Industry: A First Classification of Companies and Their Strategies, 120 INT’L J. PROD. ECONS. 1 (2009);
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As such, so long as the look and feel of the materials resemble those of
the authentic versions, “super fakes” can pass muster to the untrained, and
even trained, authenticator eye.277 This is why resellers, like Fashionphile,
are utilizing X-ray technology to inspect jewelry, handbag hardware, and
other luxury goods and developing their own patented technologically astute,
high resolution, proprietary mechanisms to ascertain the precise molecular
composition of the hardware, threading, and/or leather dyes used by a luxury
brand in its products.278 Such technology could readily and infallibly distinguish counterfeits from genuine goods thereby thwarting a luxury brand authentication challenge and potentially arming the reseller with more detailed
knowledge about the luxury product than the luxury brand itself possesses.
Though expensive and a time-intensive endeavor, its benefits would bolster
authenticity determinations, efficiency, and eliminate any chance for error,
especially in high-risk cases.
Second, and alternatively, like in the art world, resellers could outsource their authentication to third-party authenticators, as a cost-saving
measure and means of limiting overall liability. 279 Companies like Entrupy280 partner with high-end retailers and brands alike offering both 99.1%
effective authentication technology and 100% money back guarantees to
consignors if they err in authenticating a product.281 Although this process
is expensive, companies with large volumes of goods at high risk of counterfeiting could utilize an outside service to shift liability and better protect

see generally Lara Phillips, Where is Gucci Made?, BEVOIR, https://bevoir.com/where-is-guccimade/ [https://perma.cc/2Q3L-RE3Q].
277. See generally Mccall, supra note 188.
278. Id.
279. See generally Authenticating and Attributing Art: What You Need to Know, supra note
180.
280. Entrupy is a digital, AI based authentication service, touting “state-of-the-art authentication solutions” allowing users to “[e]asily authenticate anywhere, anytime with [its] mobile device and app.” ENTRUPY, https://www.entrupy.com [https://perma.cc/PHB8-V7GG].
281. Id.; Pricing, ENTRUPY, https://www.entrupy.com/plans-pricing/ [https://perma.cc
/2X4Y-7ENE] (charging just under $6,500 per year for up to 480 authentications, for a per unit
price of $13.54/authentication, and offering flexible billing for large enterprises with detailed billing).
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resellers from what would otherwise subject them to substantial damages and
negative public scrutiny.282
Third, should luxury brands be willing, resellers could partner via independent contractor agreements or licensing arrangements with luxury
brand-trained, certified authenticators. Brands tend to believe they know
their products best,283 so training and then licensing/contracting out brandtrained and approved authenticators may assuage brands’ consistency concerns and eradicate any potential liability that a non-luxury brand specific
authenticator’s error or oversight could otherwise yield. Moreover, the creation of a network similar to Amazon’s Brand Registry program284 would
allow resellers access to mark holder information to align and enhance their
authentication processes while facilitating counterfeits’ identification even
before they enter commerce.

VI. LUXURY BRAND MARK HOLDERS CAN PROTECT THEMSELVES BY
ADVOCATING FOR LEGISLATIVE/LEGAL MEASURES AND STRATEGIC
BUSINESS INITIATIVES
A. Luxury Brand Mark Holders Must Advocate for Legislative
Amendments Affording Them Litigation Free Policing Rights
Like resellers, luxury brand trademark holders would also benefit from
a respective trademark counterpart to the DMCA. As the DMCA amended
the Copyright Right Act to afford copyright owners the power to remove
infringing content online without the need for litigation,285 a similar right
should be extended to trademark holders. Affording mark holders similar
rights would not only ensure consistency across intellectual property law,
but also afford trademark holders’ recourse without incurring the hassle or
expense of litigation to protect their marks. It would also facilitate swifter
action and spare judicial resources. Finally, it heeds public policy by
282. This is what third party authentication sites advocate. See, e.g., ENTRUPY, supra note
280.
283. See, e.g., Chanel Complaint, supra note 1, at 11 (“Only Chanel itself can know what
is genuine Chanel.”).
284. See Build and Protect Your Brand, supra note 115 (which allows registered brands to
manage their brand/product data and facilitate reporting of counterfeiting and also employs tracking
technology to pre-emptively prevent suspected counterfeiters from even publishing on their platform.).
285. See 17 U.S.C. § 512; see also The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/dmca/ [https://perma.cc/7STV-YAY9].
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reinforcing trademark law’s original intent and further legitimizes trademark
law not simply as copyright and patent law’s ugly stepsibling by leveling the
playing field between the disciplines.

B. Luxury Brands Should Promulgate Qualitative and Quantitative
Industry Standards Governing Authentication, Who Can
Authenticate and Authenticator Accreditation
Chanel’s declaration reflects deeply rooted concerns with industrywide implications as to what qualifies as proper brand authentication and,
more importantly, who is qualified to authenticate on behalf of a luxury
brand. One way to address these uncertainties is for luxury brands to standardize the definition of “authentication” and delineate qualifications authenticators must possess. Using the Federal Rule of Evidence’s definition of an
“expert” 286 and the proposed New York Senate Bill S.1229A287 as templates,
luxury brands can develop brand specific definitions for who is qualified to
authenticate their goods based on objective identifiable benchmarks,288 leaving only the factual basis for the expert’s opinion for debate—at least until
fail-safe, technology-based authentication tools become common-place.
Similarly, luxury brands should consider creating an authentication licensing and/or accreditation body like those for other professions, such as
state bar associations or state medical licensing divisions, to oversee and
286. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
287. Senate Bill S1229A, which sought to amend the New York Arts and Culture law, defined “authenticator” as “a person or entity recognized in the visual arts community as having expertise regarding the artist or work of fine art with respect to whom such person or entity renders
an opinion in good faith as to the authenticity, attribution, or authorship of a work of fine art’Authenticator’ shall include, but not be limited to, authors of catalogues raisonne [sic] or other scholarly texts in which an opinion as to the authenticity, attribution or authorship of the work of fine art
is expressed or implied. ‘Authenticator’ shall not include a person that has a financial interest in
the work of fine art for which such an opinion is rendered or in any transaction concerning such
work of fine art for which the opinion is rendered, other than to be compensated for services such
person or entity engaged in to provide an opinion as to the authenticity, attribution or authorship.”
S. 1229A, 238th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016) (enacted).
288. Like the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for instance, where benchmarks are
established for states to then enact their own state-specific rules, “Model Rules of Authentication”
could establish industry minimum thresholds from which brands could develop articulable brand
specific standards. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, Table of Contents, (AM. BAR ASS’N
2020).
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regulate authenticator’s education and training prior to allowing an authenticator to work for a particular brand or a third-party authenticator. As luxury
brands enjoy the tangible and intangible (including sizeable financial) benefits to their coveted stature, they too must bear the burdens289 in establishing,
managing and funding the creation and operation of such a body. Not only
could this serve as a revenue driver for luxury brands, but it would ensure
consistent and expected standards across companies.

C. Proposed Business Solutions for Luxury Brands Involve
Embracing and Partnering with Resale in Recognizing the
Opportunities It Affords and Their Common Enemy in Counterfeiters
Fundamental to luxury brands’ future success is their reckoning with
resale. Valued at $24 billion in 2020 and expected to double in value by
2023, luxury resale is predicted to grow three times faster than the luxury
market itself.290 Luxury brands cannot afford to sit on the sidelines—or
worse, get ejected from the game—because of their attempts, whether actual
or perceived, to continue to promote exclusivity in the ways it traditionally
has.291 As younger generations engage in the resale and the sustainable fashion movement, which have democratized luxury’s accessibility,292 exclusive

289. See Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
290. Helen Siwak, The Rise of Pre-Owned Luxury Fashion Marks Shift Amid Sustainability
Movement, RETAIL INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2020), https://retail-insider.com/retail-insider/2020/03/therise-of-pre-owned-luxury-fashion-marks-shift-amid-sustainability-movement/ [https://perma.cc
/NJ9K-YND2]; Secondhand Fashion Market Is Expected to Be More Than Double the Size of Fast
Fashion by 2030, FASHION L. (June 23, 2021), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/already-displacingfast-fashion-secondhand-fashion-to-grow-into-a-77-billion-market-by-2026/
[https://perma.cc
/39UB-7HGJ]; see also 2020 Resale Report, supra note 144.
291. Chanel recently increased its prices for the third time in a span of three years. Chanel
Boosts Prices Again, Sending Price Tags Up by 15 Percent or More for Certain Bags, FASHION L.
(July 1, 2021), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/chanel-boosts-prices-again-sending-price-tags-upby-15-percent-or-more-for-certain-bags/ [https://perma.cc/JLU5-8WUJ]. While many attribute the
increases in price to the brands’ attempt to recoup losses following COVID, others believe the
brand is looking to enhance its exclusivity. See Kaitlyn McInnis, The Real Reason Louis Vuitton
and Chanel are raising their prices?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 6, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://
www.scmp.com/magazines/style/luxury/article/3127998/real-reason-louis-vuitton-and-chanelare-raising-their [https://perma.cc/M5QE-K2ZT].
292. See Adina-Laura Achim, What Happens When Luxury Becomes Too Accessible, JING
DAILY (Mar. 12, 2020), https://jingdaily.com/what-happens-when-luxury-becomes-too-accessible
/ [https://perma.cc/KVG6-GWK8] (discussing how accessibility—and not exclusivity—should
drive modern luxury).
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brands’ strategies may ultimately alienate their future consumer base.293 The
future of luxury arguably rests not in more exclusivity but in more accessibility—and embracing resale is a means by which luxury brands’ could can
achieve it.294
To achieve this goal, luxury brands should consider adopting the following business strategies: (1) hiring brand specific authenticators; (2) partner with third parties to combat counterfeiting; and (3) partner in the development of authentication technology.
First, luxury brands should consider training brand-specific authenticators who could work as independent contractors via authentication licensing
agreements to resellers or others in need of luxury authentication, subject to
narrowly drafted non-disclosure agreements. For luxury brands slow to
warm to resale, or even those wholly reticent to the idea, it offers a means of
assuaging their authentication concerns to ensure their brand specific protocols are met without meddling in or controlling resellers’ business. This is
an especially viable option given that at this point it would be “unusual”295
for luxury brands to have wholly integrated resale into their existing business
infrastructure. Indeed, bringing resale into luxury’s business fold and infrastructure would require significant planning and would be a significant financial and strategic business undertaking296 that would take years in the
making. However, even if luxury does ultimately bring resale in-house, outsourcing trained brand specific authenticators will ensure consistency across
the resale markets for independent third-party resellers.

293. Id. (“But today’s ‘fashion for all’ mentality is killing exclusivity and creating an overexposed world where luxury’s appealing symbolic assets are beginning to disappear.”).
294. Id.
295. Chitrakorn, supra note 228 (explaining that luxury brands remain skeptical because
they fear opening luxury owned resale shops will “take up too much market share of selling new
products.”).
296. Id. (“To create your own offering requires a reasonable amount of investment and
logistics. It’s one of the reasons why some luxury brands are undertaking tests in the form of partnerships with existing secondhand players. . . . One of the greatest challenges is how to run this
model in a way that’s economically sustainable.”).
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Second, heeding the lead of two notable Italian designers, namely Ferragamo297 and Valentino,298 other luxury brands should partner—not sue—
third-party platforms and resellers in fighting counterfeiters for two reasons.
First, all parties share a common enemy in counterfeiters and counterfeiting,
and second, with pooled resources, technology, and data,299 they can coordinate legal efforts to more effectively target counterfeiters while promoting
judicial economy and preserving resources, as Gucci and Facebook recently
have.300
Lastly, luxury brands should continue to invest and partner together in
the development and shared use of blockchain technology.301 Blockchain
297. See generally Timeline, SALVATORE FERRAGAMO, https://www.ferragamo.com/shop
/us/en/sf/stories/timeline#group1890s_1898 [https://perma.cc/F6Y6-37SF] (Salvatore Ferragamo
founded his eponymous brand of the same name in Florence in and around 1930, after first learning
about shoe design from Hollywood films after having moved to California with his family. Headquartered in Florence, the label is known for being one of the first sustainable shoe companies,
along with its leather ware and infamous bow-stacked heel shoe, the Vara.).
298. See generally MAISON VALENTINO, https://www.valentino.com/en-us/world-of-valentino/maison [https://archive.is/9jdwi].
299. See How to Use Data to Build a Better Brand, BUS. OF FASHION (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://www.businessoffashion.com/videos/technology/how-to-use-data-to-build-a-better-brand
[https://perma.cc/UFW3-2TGM] (Partnering with resale can afford luxury brands invaluable insight into brand resale data. This data can assist luxury with design strategies in understanding
which styles are highly counterfeited and help guide their future manufacturing and business strategies.).
300. See Facebook, Inc. v. Kokhtenko, No. 4:21-cv-03036, 2021 WL 3373211, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 3, 2021) (Gucci and Facebook partnered and filed a lawsuit against an international online
counterfeit business operator who created and operated multiple accounts across both Facebook
and Instagram to sell counterfeit goods. Facebook alleged breach of contract arising out of violations of Facebook and Instagram’s terms, while Gucci contends the operator infringed on Gucci’s
intellectual property rights, including trademark counterfeiting and unfair competition); see also
Luisa Zargani & Adriana Lee, Gucci, Facebook File Joint Lawsuit in Counterfeit Fight, WWD
(Apr. 27, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://wwd.com/business-news/legal/gucci-facebook-file-joint-lawsuit-counterfeit-fight-1234810544/ [https://archive.ph/qaLNE].
301. See What is Blockchain?, EUROMONEY, https://www.euromoney.com/learning
/blockchain-explained/what-is-blockchain [https://perma.cc/3KAB-6LWR] (Blockchain offers resale and brands alike transparency in readily enabling authentication by examining a particular
good’s history, from manufacturing through first sale, and down the stream of commerce because
it guarantees the proper handoff of third-party goods and final product labeling. Blockchain can
also track the progression of assets, record the information, and show previous asset records.); see
also How Blockchain is Paving the Way for Greater Transparency and Sustainability Within the
Fashion Industry, FASHION UNITED (July 19, 2021), https://fashionunited.uk/news/business/howblockchain-is-paving-the-way-for-greater-transparency-sustainability-within-the-fashion-industry
/2021011953031 [perma.cc/LT3C-2QSA]; see, e.g., Blockchain in Retail Fashion & Luxury,
CONSENSYS,
https://consensys.net/blockchain-use-cases/retail-fashion-and-luxury/
[https://
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technology is a digital technology asset designed to prevent hacking, tampering with or adulterating the supply chain for any material or product that
utilizes it.302 It is comprised of “a digital ledger of transactions that is duplicated and distributed across the entire network of computer systems on the
blockchain.”303 “Each block in the chain contains a number of transactions,
and every time a new transaction occurs on the blockchain, a record of that
transaction is added to every participant’s ledger.”304 In fashion, this technology is used to trace the supply chain of materials, ownership and in order
to ascertain source and identification for trademark/authentication purposes.305
Luxury brands, such as Louis Vuitton, have developed their own proprietary blockchain entitled Aura306 that the brand hopes the luxury goods
industry will adopt and utilize.307 As of late, Louis Vuitton announced a
partnership with Cartier and Prada in the Aura Blockchain Consortium.308
Adopting a common blockchain technology will guarantee the authenticity
of any good simply by examining the good’s embedded data, which will reveal everything about the good’s history from the moment the good is
perma.cc/5KTZ-XT5P] (explaining how blockchain promotes transparency and sustainability in
the good’s supply chain and guarantees as to a product’s authenticity).
302. See What is Blockchain?, supra note 302; see also How Blockchain is Paving the Way
for Greater Transparency and Sustainability in the Fashion Industry, FASHION UNITED (July 29,
2021),
https://fashionunited.uk/news/business/how-blockchain-is-paving-the-way-for-greatertransparency-sustainability-within-the-fashion-industry/2021011953031 [https://perma.cc/8WJNAW39].
303. What is Blockchain?, supra note 301.
304. Id.
305. Id.; see also Florine Eppe Beauloye, Luxury Resale: How Blockchain Helps Fight
Counterfeit and Improve Traceability, LUXE DIGIT., https://luxe.digital/business/digital-luxurytrends/luxury-resale-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/PR8G-KKJ7]; How Blockchain is Paving the
Way for Greater Transparency and Sustainability in the Fashion Industry, supra note 302.
306. See Wanguba Muriuki, Louis Vuitton Sets Sight on an AURA Blockchain Launch,
COIN SPEAKER (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:38 PM), https://www.coinspeaker.com/louis-vuittons-aurablockchain/ [https://perma.cc/VB8Q-ZRDG].
307. Id.
308. See Elizabeth Paton, LVMH, Richemont and Prada Unite Behind a Blockchain Consortium, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/business/lvmhrichemont-prada-blockchain.html [https://perma.cc/GH7T-2TC8].
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sourced, through manufacturing, and down the stream of commerce.309
Moreover, the adoption of blockchain across the luxury goods industry could
finally provide an industry standard for authentication which would not only
facilitate authentication, but more readily distinguish super fakes from authentic goods merely by examining the embedded data.310 Collaborating
with resellers to drive and develop a shared solution not only heeds the
“traceability, sustainability and authenticity” goals both resellers and luxury
brands share,311 but the ensuing benefit could further streamline the industry
through technological policing of super-fakes by consumers, brands, law enforcement, and customs and border patrol alike.

VII. CONCLUSION
Whether prompted by the mainstream adoption of sustainability as a
result of the environmental crisis or because shopping second-hand is the
new fashion trend, every single retailer and luxury brand must reckon with
resale. Not only will resale inevitably become “‘an assumed part of the shopping experience,’”312 but consumers are demanding it as reflected by the unparalleled growth of the resale industry. However, the consequence of lightning speed growth is often the law’s inability to keep pace. While many
luxury brands grapple with the “problem” of resale and attempt to manage
the “problem” by taking matters into their own hands, they have done so in
ways that push the boundaries of the law past the point of no return. Fearing
that resale will siphon away luxury goods’ consumer base, devalue their respective brands and market value, and undermine their global reputation in
being too accessible and thus not scarce, luxury brands have lost sight of the
fact that luxury itself created the resale market. Indeed, the hand-crafted,
durable, high quality, legacy products, with tightly controlled distribution,
are the coveted products at the heart of the booming luxury resale market.

309. See Muriuki, supra note 306.
310. See LVMH Partners with Other Major Luxury Companies on Aura, the First Global
Luxury Blockchain, LVMH (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.lvmh.com/news-documents/news/lvmhpartners-with-other-major-luxury-companies-on-aura-the-first-global-luxury-blockchain/ [https://
perma.cc/P8VP-U7J7].
311. Id.
312. Eliza Brooke, How a Booming Resale Business Could Lead the Future of Sustainable
Fashion, REFINERY 29 (Sept. 30, 2019, 8:25 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2019/09
/8356152/resale-sustainable-market [https://perma.cc/62AD-R4VS].
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Ironically, the more luxury brands resist resale, the more brands may devalue
themselves—especially in consumers’ eyes.313
The growth of resale and proliferation of counterfeiting necessitated
luxury brands’ involvement in resale, but the unintended consequences of
too heavily relying on trademark law as a means of policing counterfeits effectively undermines those efforts. Instead, luxury brands and resellers must
advocate for legal and legislative change and implement alternate business
strategies facilitating resale engagement without triggering monopoly scrutiny. Resellers and luxury brands could equally benefit from a trademark
counterpart to the DMCA. A trademark specific DMCA-like statute could
afford resellers safe harbor for their good faith authentication efforts. Moreover, a statute could also afford luxury brands direct rights of action so they
could police counterfeits without instituting litigation. These benefits would
promote judicial economy in reducing unnecessary litigation in already
clogged courts and allow the respective parties to target the real enemy in
counterfeiters. Resellers should also lobby to codify the first sale doctrine
to ensure consistent interpretation of the doctrine across jurisdictions. For
consistency, luxury brands’ should consider creating luxury brand authentication licensing and accreditation bodies along with promulgating industry
standards to enforce such standards industry wide. This would reduce debate, confusion, and litigation.
Finally, business solutions grounded in mutually beneficial strategic
approaches will facilitate collaboration between luxury brands and resellers
instead of luxury brands’ usurpation of the commercial resale stream. By
working together with resellers, luxury brands can walk the walk and talk
the sustainability talk in ways that are as outwardly consistent as they are
strategic because the court of public opinion often carries more weight in our
social media driven world than those of the law if they opt otherwise. Besides, in a consumer driven society where the court of public opinion is often
unforgiving, aligning with sustainability will solidify luxury brands’ place in

313. This may explain why as of April 5, 2021, Chanel and The RealReal agreed to a three
month litigation stay in lieu of mediation, as luxury fashion enthusiasts have grown more critical
of luxury brands’ approach to resale and third-party resellers. Joint Stipulation & Ord., supra note
1; see, e.g., The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury Brands, supra note
163; Marie Sina, Secondhand Gucci: Luxury Labels’ Future Is in Shoppers’ Closets, DW (Mar. 16,
2021), https://www.dw.com/en/second-hand-fashion-market-gucci-alexander-mcqueen-hermeschanel/a-56840485 [https://perma.cc/EW4L-M5P4]; Becca Risa Luna, Chanel Sues Luxury Resellers TheRealReal and What Goes Around Comes Around for Selling Counterfeits, COFFEE &
HANDBAGS (Nov. 19, 2018), https://coffeeandhandbags.com/2018/11/19/chanel-sues-luxury-resellers-therealreal-and-what-goes-around-comes-around-for-selling-counterfeits/ [https://perma.cc
/7RZ8-4ZL3].
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the minds and pocketbooks of future luxury clients. Moreover, in doing so,
luxury brands can save face with—instead of alienating—the very consumer
base luxury needs to ensure its longevity. After all, luxury brands lest not
risk unintentionally adding sticks to the trademark bundle.

